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Executive summary 
This thesis aims to detect whether fiscal policy convergence (or divergence) is a 
determinant of business cycle synchronization in the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union. The thesis is based on the 
literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) which states that a common 
currency and a collective monetary policy are most appropriate if business cycles 
are synchronized across countries. We contribute to the discussion on the 
European Union (EU) as an optimum currency area by studying if fiscal policy 
convergence increases business cycle synchronization in the EMU. This is done 
by addressing the two Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), as it is the tool for coordination of fiscal policy across the 
EMU.    
 
While the majority of existing literature on fiscal policy focuses on discretionary 
fiscal spending, our thesis also studies fiscal policy in the form of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers, namely governmental revenues and expenditures which size is 
determined by the phase of the country’s business cycle. Additionally, we address 
the impact of debt dynamics by using interest payments as a measure of 
accumulated debt. Fiscal policy divergence is measured as four independent 
variables: the structural deficit divergence, cyclical deficit divergence, primary 
deficit divergence, and interest payments divergence. Our data expands over the 
period 1980-2010. We conduct bilateral fixed effect analyses in order to account 
for country-pair specific effects. Our first finding suggests that convergence of 
automatic stabilizers increases business cycle synchronization. This is particularly 
interesting as the majority of earlier studies do not account for automatic 
stabilizers, but focus on discretionary fiscal policy as a determinant of business 
cycle synchronization. Our second finding is that convergence of accumulated 
debt increases business cycle synchronization. The findings are especially 
interesting in combination, as they link the two convergence criteria of Maastricht. 
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1. Introduction 
One decade after the introduction of the euro as the common currency, the 
European Union (EU) finds itself in times of sovereign debt crises amongst the 
member states. Unsustainable fiscal policy conducted in some member states has 
been blamed to challenge the economic integration in the union. Precisely, the 
fiscal integration makes the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the 
European Union one in a kind of monetary unions. The EMU does not have a 
central fiscal authority, but 17 member states1 performing fiscal policy 
individually, under the restrictions provided by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), to maintain macroeconomic stability.  
 
Robert Mundell published A theory of optimum currency areas in 1961, four 
decades before the implementation of the euro as a common currency in the EMU. 
Mundell’s paper explores the proper conduction of fiscal and monetary policies in 
a currency area. Subsequent contributions to the literature on optimum currency 
areas (OCAs) emphasize the importance of business cycle synchronization for a 
currency area to be optimal. A common currency on a continent where the social, 
political and economic conditions are heterogeneous has inspired a line of 
research on the effects of convergence in economic policies on business cycle 
synchronization. This thesis focuses on convergence of fiscal policy in the EMU 
as a determinant of business cycle synchronization. We define our research 
question as: 
 
DOES FISCAL POLICY CONVERGENCE (OR DIVERGENCE) BETWEEN TWO EMU 
COUNTRIES AFFECT THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THESE COUNTRIES’ 
BUSINESS CYCLES?  
 
Fiscal policy is measured through different approaches in the literature. Primary 
deficit, discretionary fiscal policy and structural fiscal policy are measures that 
have been used interchangeably. We provide a distinction between structural and 
cyclical deficit to obtain a measure of respectively discretionary fiscal spending 
and automatic fiscal stabilizers. Also, we provide a distinction between primary 
deficit and interest payments to obtain a measure of a general fiscal deficit 
                                                 
1
 The euro zone consists of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
Estonia became a member in 2011. 
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(including both structural and cyclical deficit) and interest payments as a proxy of 
accumulated government debt. Our main finding is that both convergence of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers and convergence of accumulated government debt 
increases business cycle synchronization.   
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) 
In 1961, Robert Mundell published the article “A theory of optimum currency 
areas” (Mundell, 1961). At this time, participating countries of the Bretton Woods 
system had pegged their national currencies to the US dollar which again had a 
fixed exchange rate to gold. In his article, Mundell (1961) questions: What is the 
appropriate domain of a currency area? Mundell stresses that the flexible 
exchange rate is presented as a “device whereby depreciation can take the place of 
unemployment when the external balance is in deficit, and appreciation can 
replace inflation when it is in surplus” (Mundell, 1961, p. 657). A single currency 
area implies a single central bank, which will challenge possible needs of 
adjustment between countries. Mundell’s discussion entails these needs of 
adjustments under a fixed exchange rate regime. Mundell (1961, p. 657) states 
that: 
 
“It is patently obvious that periodic balance-of-payments crises will remain an 
integral feature of the international economic system as long as fixed exchange 
rates and rigid wage and price levels prevent the terms of trade from fulfilling a 
natural role in the adjustment process.”  
 
Mundell argues that the optimum area for a single currency is a region, or an 
economic unit, within each of which there is factor mobility and between which 
there is factor immobility. Each region should have a separate currency which 
fluctuates relative to all other currencies.  
 
When discussing the practical application of his theory, Mundell stresses that it is 
based on the Ricardian assumption that factors of production are mobile 
internally, but immobile internationally. He argues that the argument for flexible 
exchange rate based on national currencies, is only as valid as the Ricardian 
assumption about factor mobility. Meanwhile, “if regions cut across boundaries or 
countries are multiregional, then the argument for flexible exchange rates is only 
valid if currencies are reorganized on a regional basis” (Mundell, 1961, p. 661). 
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Such reorganization should be possible if it is accompanied by a “profound 
political change” as the currency is an expression of national sovereignty 
(Mundell, 1961, p. 661). To achieve equilibrium with fixed exchange rate, it is 
thus important that fiscal policy is appropriately mixed with monetary policy. If 
monetary policy is contractionary, fiscal policy should be shifted to expansionary, 
and vice versa. This leads to Mundell's assignment rule: Assign to fiscal policy the 
task of stabilizing the domestic economy only, and assign to monetary policy the 
task of stabilizing the balance of payments (Pugel, 2007).  
 
2.2 The Mundell trade-off and the OCA properties 
The OCA theory is often used as a benchmark for the analysis of the costs and 
benefits of monetary integration in trade unions, and other authors base their 
research on Mundell’s work. McKinnon (1961) and Kenen (1969) are important 
contributors in this literature by establishing properties for an optimal currency 
area.  
 
The OCA theory postulates that benefits can be gained in a currency union with a 
common monetary policy if the countries forming a monetary union share certain 
common characteristics. The economic benefits from a single currency and 
monetary institution derive from eliminated transaction costs of doing business 
with many different currencies, and eliminated risks to business associated with 
fluctuating currencies. Whether the increased trade within a monetary union 
represents a net benefit depends on the relative importance of trade-creating 
effects - meaning the increased trade among the member countries - and trade- 
diverting effects - meaning the diversion of existing imports from countries 
outside the monetary union to countries inside it (Feldstein, 1997). The economic 
costs of giving up national currency might be substantially higher than the 
benefits. Moving monetary policy authority to a union-wide central bank means 
that monetary policy and the exchange rate cannot be tailored to fit national 
conditions, but must be collectively decided for the whole union.  
 
The trade-off between stabilization losses and transaction cost reductions is called 
the Mundell trade-off. The OCA theory argues that a collective monetary policy is 
most appropriate if regional trade levels are high, labor is very mobile, economic 
shocks affect the different geographic parts of the currency union in similar ways, 
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there are compensating fiscal transfers across the monetary union to make up for 
uneven economic development, and that business cycles are synchronized. These 
characteristics are called the OCA properties (McKinnon, 1961; Kenen, 1969). 
The latter property is seen as the most important one, and form the basis of this 
thesis.  
 
2.3 Business cycles and business cycle synchronization 
Business cycles are economy-wide fluctuations in economic activity, meaning that 
the state of the economy repeatedly alternates between business cycle expansions 
characterized by rapid growth, and business cycle recessions characterized by 
declining economic activity (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010).  
 
The American economists Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell (1946) emphasize 
several points in their definition of business cycles. Firstly, business cycles are 
characterized by a co-movement of a large number of economic activities. 
Secondly, business cycles are a phenomenon occurring in decentralized market 
economies. Thirdly, business cycles are characterized by periods of expansion of 
economic activity followed by periods of contraction in which economic activity 
declines. Fourthly, a full business cycle lasts for more than a year, or more 
specifically for no less than six quarters (18 months). Lastly, business cycles are 
not strictly periodic although they repeat themselves.  
 
The literature defines two main types of business cycle: the classical cycle and the 
growth (or deviation) cycle. The classical cycle identifies turning points on the 
basis of an absolute fall or rise in the value of GDP (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 
2010). Burns and Mitchell (1946)  proposed a definition in which a business cycle 
is a sequence of expansions and contractions of economic activity, paying a 
particular attention to peaks, troughs, turning points, and their timing.  
 
The growth cycle, or the deviation cycle, defines alternating periods of expansion 
and contraction in macroeconomic activity with respect to deviations of the GDP 
growth rate from an appropriately defined trend rate of growth. According to this 
definition, which was initially proposed by Lucas (1980) and then refined by 
Kydland and Prescott (1990), the business cycle is simply the fluctuations in real 
GDP along the steady-state of growth. 
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According to the OCA theory, business cycles of countries sharing the same 
currency, and thus having a fixed exchange rate, should be synchronized. The 
reason is simple: when economic fluctuations in two or more countries are 
symmetric, the need for stabilization policy is also symmetric (Buti and Sapir 
1998). On the other hand, when the cycle is not synchronized, the need for 
stabilization policies will differ among the countries. If economic fluctuations in 
countries within a monetary union are asynchronous, the member states will have 
little incentive to adopt common policies and to cooperate in the operation of the 
union. Having a fixed exchange rate, excludes the possibility to use monetary 
policy as a stabilizing instrument.  
 
3. European Monetary Union (EMU) 
3.1 The European Monetary System 
From 1967, the prevailing world order for exchange rates, established as part of 
the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, began to fall apart (El-Agraa and Mayes 
2007). The European Community (EC) looked at the possibility of trying to create 
a locally stable system with the same sort of architecture for itself. After the 
failure of the “snake in the tunnel”,2 a new proposal for EMU was put forward in 
1977 by the president of the European Commission, Roy Jenkins. It approved in a 
limited form, and was launched as the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
March 1979, with the participation of all member states’ currencies except the 
British pound which joined later, in 1990, but only stayed for two years. This 
system was based on stable, but adjustable, exchange rates of the national 
currencies in relation to the newly created European Currency Unit (ECU). 
Currency fluctuations were controlled through the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). The EMS was a radical innovation because exchange rates could only be 
changed by mutual agreement between participating member states and the 
Commission (The European Commission, 2011). After the introduction of the 
euro, the ERM was replaced by ERM II to ensure that exchange rate fluctuations 
between the euro and other EU currencies do not disrupt economic stability within 
the single market (European Commission, 2011).  
                                                 
2
 The snake in the tunnel’ was an attempt at creating a single currency band for the European 
Economic Community (EEC), essentially pegging all the EEC currencies to one another. The 
Smithsonian agreement set bands of ±2.25% for currencies to move relative to their central rate 
against the US dollar. This provided a tunnel in which European currencies to trade. 
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3.2 The three stages of EMU 
In 1988 a committee chaired by the EU president Jacques Delors, was appointed 
to study and propose concrete stages leading towards a monetary union in the 
European Union (El-Agraa and Mayes 2007). The “Delors Report” pointed out 
that the creation of the EMU must be seen as a single process in three stages, with 
the ultimate goal being a single currency with an independent European Central 
Bank. The decision to enter upon the first stage should commit a member state to 
the entire process. The EMU would require a common monetary policy and a high 
degree of compatibility of economic policies and consistency in other policy 
areas, particularly in the fiscal field (El-Agraa and Mayes 2007).  
 
The three stages towards the EMU were: 
Stage 1 (1990-1994): This stage included the completion of the internal market 
and the removal of restrictions of further financial integration. It was 
characterized mainly by the abolition of off all internal barriers to the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital - commonly known as the four 
freedoms - within EU member states (European Central Bank, 2011).  
Stage 2 (1994-1999): This stage included the establishment of the European 
Monetary Institute to strengthen central bank co-operation and prepare for the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In addition, it included defining the 
future governance of the euro area and achieving economic convergence between 
the member states.  
Stage 3 (1999 and continuing): This stage included fixing the final exchange rates 
and transition to the euro, establishing the ECB and ESCB with independent 
monetary policy-making, and implementing binding budgetary rules in the 
member states (The European Commission, 2011). 11 EU member states joined 
the euro after meeting the convergence criteria.3 Greece joined the euro area in 
2001. 
 
3.3 Introducing the euro: convergence criteria 
The Madrid European Council of June 1989 decided to proceed to the first stage 
of EMU in July 1990 and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) - the Maastricht 
Treaty - set the “Maastricht convergence criteria” that member states would have 
                                                 
3
 The first 11 countries to join the euro were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  
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to meet in order to adopt a single currency. The Maastricht criteria were designed 
to ensure that a member state’s economy was sufficiently prepared for the 
adoption of the euro. Sustained economic convergence efforts by individual 
member states were important for the creation of an environment of price stability 
in Europe after the introduction of the single currency (European Central Bank, 
2011). The four main Maastricht criteria were price stability, exchange rates, 
long-term interest rates, and government finances (European Union, 2011). 
Firstly, the inflation rate of a given member state must not exceed by more than 
1,5 percentage points that of the three best-performing member states in terms of 
price stability during the year preceding the examination of the situation in that 
member state. Secondly, the member state must have participated in the ERM II 
without any break during two years before adopting the euro, and must not have 
devaluated its currency. Thirdly, the nominal long-term interest rate must not 
exceed by more than 2 percentage point that of the three best-performing member 
states in terms of price stability one year before adopting the euro (European 
Union, 2011). Lastly, there are constraints designed to impose prudence on fiscal 
policy, or government finances, so that no country’s debt can start to raise the 
interest rates or lower the credit rating of the other EMU countries. These ‘fiscal 
convergence criteria’ limit the annual budget deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP and 
the gross public debt not to exceed 60% of GDP.  
 
3.4 Monetary policy in EMU  
The European Central Bank makes the monetary policy for the EMU member 
states. Together with the national central banks the ECB make up the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB). Monetary policy actions are taken by the 
Governing Council of the ESCB4, and monetary policy decisions are 
communicated by the president of the ECB or by its press office (Jones, 2006). 
The ECB aims to provide a stable economic environment across the EU by 
maintaining price stability (McNamara, 2006). The executive board of the ECB 
developed a two-track operational approach: monetary targeting (amount of 
money is measured) and inflation targeting.  
 
                                                 
4
 The Governing Council of the ESCB includes representatives of each member state central banks 
in the eurozone, plus the six members of the executive board of the ECB. 
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3.5 Fiscal policy in EMU 
The EMU does not have a central fiscal authority; meanwhile, the EU has 
implemented a centralized budget. The centralized budget amounts to 1 per cent 
of EU GDP and at this level, the budget cannot constitute a real macroeconomic 
policy instrument for stabilization (El-Agraa, 2007). The fiscal policy thus 
remains at a sovereign level in the EMU, but the EU constrains the ability of the 
member states to run independent fiscal policies. These constraints are to avoid 
excessive fiscal deficits and ‘to respect the medium-term budgetary objective of 
close to balance or in surplus’ (Jones, 2006, p. 332). The fiscal governance in 
EMU is executed through three types of constraints: the Maastricht criteria (see 
chapter 3.3) , the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and annual settings of Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) (Jones, 2006). This thesis focuses on the 
Maastricht criteria and SGP. 
 
3.5.1 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)  
To ensure that the member states would continue to comply with the Maastricht 
criteria, in particular the fiscal convergence criteria, after joining the EMU, the 
SGP was adopted in 1997. In line with the monetary policy, SGP’s paramount 
objective is to secure price stability, enhancing the credibility of the euro. SGP is 
a rule-based framework implemented for the coordination of national fiscal 
policies within EMU. It is based on article 99 and article 104 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEC)5. The SGP consists of a resolution 
and two regulations that are called the preventive and the corrective arm. The 
coordination among the member states takes place through the structure of 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council, assisted by the Commission, and 
includes the ability to impose financial penalties on member states that do not 
adhere to the prudent limits.  
 
The preventive arm’s purpose is to provide guidelines to make sure that the 
member states run sustainable fiscal policies by strengthening ‘the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies’. 
The member states are obliged to submit annual stability or convergence 
                                                 
5
 The TEC was renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) with the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007. Article 99 now constitutes article 121 in TFEU, 
and article 104 now constitutes article 126 in TFEU. 
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programs, where they outline medium term objectives related to fiscal policies 
and the national fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria. The Commission assesses 
the programmes, and the Council gives its opinion. The Council can, on the basis 
of a proposal by the Commission, issue an early warning to a member state in 
order to prevent an excessive deficit. The Commission can address policy 
recommendations to a member state directly if it regards the broad implications of 
the nation’s fiscal policies. 
 
The regulation of the dissuasive arm of the SGP concerns ‘speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP) (TFEU 
article 126). If a member state exceeds the deficit threshold, the EDP is triggered 
at EU level. The Council will issue recommendations and deadlines for 
implementation of action to the specific member state. If the member state does 
not comply, it may face financial sanctions.  
 
3.5.2 The challenges of the SGP 
In 2003, France, Germany, Italy, Greece and Portugal, were exceeding the deficit 
threshold. The SGP broke down. The 3% criterion was criticized by the member 
states for being too strict in times of cyclical downturns in the economy. The 
argument was that if a state is to stabilize the fluctuations in its business cycle, it 
needs some economic room. If the state is close to the 3% deficit-to-GDP ratio, 
the room may be too small to act (Mayes, 2009). Therefore, the SGP was revised 
in 2005. The revised version allowed more room before identifying an excessive 
deficit, improvement of governance process of surveillance, and improvement of 
statistics and accounting balances. In order to account for macroeconomic 
imbalances, the 2005-revision made it possible to revise member states’ criteria 
compliances due to special events.  
 
After the financial crisis in 2008, the SGP was revised for the second time in the 
beginning of 2011.6 The reformed 2011 SGP has a strengthened EDP.  It is stricter 
in terms of governance, and sanctions can immediately be applied. Motivated to 
enhance member states attainment to their medium term objectives, the reformed 
                                                 
6
 The first suggestion to improvement of the economic governance was presented to the Council in 
the report “Strengthening the economic governance in the EU” October 21st 2010.  The Council 
agreed on the measures the 15th of March 2011.  
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SGP contains an expenditure benchmark (Buti, 2011). This implies that annual 
expenditure growth should not exceed a reference medium-term rate of GDP 
growth. The aim is that excessive government revenue shall be used on debt 
reduction and not on further spending. The reformed SGP also contains a 
benchmark for sufficiently diminishing debt ratio (Buti, 2011). The benchmark is 
supposed to gauge whether the debt ratio is sufficiently diminishing towards the 
60% of GDP threshold (European Commission, 2011).    
 
4. Business Cycles and the Euro Area: State of the Art 
In the debate about business cycles, fiscal policy, and business cycle 
synchronization in the euro area three main issues are being discussed: whether 
business cycles in the euro area converged after the introduction of the single 
currency, how politicians use fiscal policy as an instrument to stabilize business 
cycle fluctuations, and the issue of which factors that drive business cycle 
synchronization. 
 
4.1 Monetary integration and synchronization of business cycles 
There is little agreement in literature whether monetary integration will lead to 
more similar business cycles. This is not surprising as an argument can be made in 
both directions (Haan, Inklaar, & Jong-A-Pin, 2008). On the one hand, monetary 
integration may lead to more similarity since there will be less asymmetry in 
monetary policies. In addition, monetary integration may lead to more 
synchronization through the impact of exchange rate stability on trade relations. 
Increasing intra-EMU trade along with decreasing capital controls leading to a 
more integrated economic system may result in a more homogeneous currency 
area. On the other hand, if exchange rate changes are considered to be a shock 
absorbing mechanism, a common currency may lead to less synchronization if the 
countries in a monetary union face asymmetric shocks. 
 
Analyzing the business cycle synchronization of EU countries, researchers have 
looked at changes in correlation patterns over time. Artis and Zhang (1997) 
examine the question of whether the functioning of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System has produced a 
strengthening of the linkages between the participating economies, and whether 
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this will result in a dilution of the effect of the US business cycle on these 
economies in favor of a stronger effect from the German business cycle. They 
employ monthly data for industrial production and three methods of de-trending a 
growth cycle. Dividing the sample period between a pre- and a post-ERM period, 
they find that the linkages between the ERM economies and Germany have grown 
whilst the linkages with the US cycle have diminished. Accordingly, they argue in 
favor of the emergence of a group-specific ‘European business cycle’ in the ERM 
period, fairly independent of the US cycle. The authors conclude that the nominal 
exchange rate peg of the ERM agreement appears to be an explanation for the 
observed European business cycle.  
 
Massmann and Mitchell (2004) partly confirm the findings of Artis and Zhang. 
They examine seven measures of the ‘growth’ business cycle, and a measure of 
the ‘classical’ business cycle, and highlight that empirical inference about 
individual eurozone business cycles is found to be sensitive to the measure of 
business cycles considered. Nevertheless, their measure of convergence between 
eurozone business cycles reveals common features, namely that periods of 
convergence are distinguished from periods of divergence. They suggest that the 
eurozone has entered a period of convergence after a period of divergence in the 
early 1990s, and see their result as consistent with the emergence of a common 
eurozone business cycle. The authors expect the trend towards convergence to 
continue because fixed exchange rate is believed to encourage the emergence of a 
common business cycle for countries within the eurozone. 
 
Altavilla (2004) investigates whether the establishment of the European currency 
union has resulted in increased business cycle synchronization in the EMU 
participating countries. The author computes a concordance index and cross-
correlation analysis and finds both an alignment of each national business cycle 
with the aggregate euro area cycle and a high correlation across European 
economies. Further, the author divides the sample period into the pre-Maastricht 
and the post-Maastricht period and finds that affiliation of EMU members’ 
business cycles has moved from the US to the euro area. Thus, Altavilla (2004) 
concludes that monetary integration has led to an increase in the business cycle 
affiliation of the participating economies.  
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Furceri and Karras (2006) analyze cyclical output for the EU-15 countries. They 
find that business cycle synchronization has increased for many countries from 
1980–1991 to 1992–2003. Furceri and Karras (2008) find that all countries in 
their EU sample are better synchronized with the EMU-wide economy in the post-
EMU period than they were before the euro. They also show that this increase in 
synchronization is present in all components of aggregate demand and supply, but 
is more pronounced in the trade components, that is imports and exports.  In 
addition, they show that the increase in trade within the euro area is at least partly 
responsible for the increase in cyclical synchronization. 
 
The literature has not agreed on a single interpretation of the likely effects of the 
creation of a monetary union on the business cycles of EMU countries (Altavilla, 
2004). One example is Krugman (1991), who asserts that the business cycles of 
countries joining a monetary union in Europe will become less synchronized as 
the result of a specialization process followed by the increasing commercial 
integration of the participating economies. According to his view, the commercial 
integration leads to regional concentration of economic activities. As the 
composition of the EMU members’ aggregate demand is likely to change to 
accommodate this concentration process, the probability that a shock impinges on 
EMU members’ output asymmetrically increases. 
 
Haan, Inklaar and Sleijpen (2002) are more specific than Krugman, and analyze 
whether exchange rate stability has affected the synchronization of business 
cycles in 18 OECD countries over the years 1961–97 in order to answer if further 
integration will make business cycles in EMU countries more similar. They divide 
the sample period in four phases: the Bretton Woods period (1961-73), a period 
without stable exchange rate arrangement within Europe (1973-79), the first ERM 
period (1979-87), and the second ERM period (1987-97). The authors find that 
exchange rate stability has a negative effect on business cycle synchronization. 
Thus, they argue that monetary integration in itself may lead to less synchronization as 
the stabilizing influence of exchange rate fluctuations is removed. 
 
4.2 Fiscal policy and business cycles volatility 
A line of study focuses on the role of fiscal policy in influencing the volatility of 
business cycles. A common approach is to measure either discretionary fiscal 
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policy, or the cyclical budget balance. From this approach one can investigate if 
fiscal policy in EMU acts countercyclical or procyclical,7 and thus if the fiscal 
policy acts smoothing on business cycle volatility or not. Sovereign debt is an 
important issue as regards the financing of fiscal spending, and has therefore been 
explored in literature on fiscal policy. 
 
4.2.1 Discretionary fiscal policy 
Fatás and Mihov (2000) conduct an empirical study of the effects of fiscal policy 
by looking into the dynamic effects of discretionary changes in fiscal policy. 
Their sample consists of data from 20 OECD economies during the period 1960-
1997, and the authors argue that their estimates should provide a benchmark for 
the discussion of national fiscal policies in eurozone countries. Their goal is to 
study how the economy reacts to various shifts in discretionary fiscal policy by 
using different methods of identification of discretionary fiscal policy shocks. The 
authors find strong effects of changes in fiscal policy on economic activity. 
 
Gali and Perrotti (2003) investigate if the Maastricht criteria and the SGP have 
weakened the ability of EU governments to conduct a stabilizing fiscal policy and 
to provide an adequate level of public infrastructure. They estimate fiscal rules for 
the discretionary budget deficit over the period 1980-2002, and divide the time 
series in two periods: before and after the Maastricht treaty (1980-1991 and 1992-
2002). Gali and Perotti identify discretionary policy by controlling for the cyclical 
component. Thus, they argue the discretionary policy to be the fiscal stance. By 
dividing the fiscal stance in an endogenous and an exogenous component, the 
authors distinguish between structural and random spending and revenues. Their 
main finding is that discretionary policy in EMU has become more 
countercyclical over time, and this is a trend that also concerns other 
industrialized countries.  
 
Sebastian Dullien (2007) analyzes to what degree fiscal policy functions as a 
stabilizing tool in the EMU, and how this could be improved. The sample includes 
12 EMU countries over the time period 1991-2006 and four OECD countries. 
                                                 
7
 If fiscal policy works countercyclical it works against the cyclical tendencies in the economy. If 
fiscal policy works procyclical it works in the same direction as the cyclical tendencies in the 
economy. 
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Dullien divides the time series in two periods: before and after the introduction of 
EMU in 1999 (1991-1998 and 1999-2006). Dullien’s results on discretionary 
policy differ from Gali and Perotti, as Dullien finds discretionary policy to be 
acyclical and procyclical, depending on the country. He argues that discretionary 
fiscal policy suffers from information problems due to the fact that 
macroeconomic shocks are hard to predict as aggregated data are published six 
weeks after the end of a quarter. 
 
Candelon et al. (2007) also come to a different conclusion than Gali and Perotti. 
Candelon et al. analyze the stability of fiscal rules for EMU countries in the time-
periods before and after the Maastricht treaty. Fiscal policy is divided into 
discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy. The sample includes the years 
1980-2004. The authors find that discretionary policy remains procyclical after 
1992. Candelon et al. argue that the fiscal arrangements induced by EMU have 
provided less room for effective discretionary policy. Another finding is that fiscal 
rules differ between large and small countries. Large countries follow a 
procyclical discretionary policy.    
 
Dinu et al. (2011) use a reaction function model of fiscal policy to study the 
behavior of governments in the eurozone countries. They include the first twelve 
member states of the EMU in the period 1990-2009. They study three models, 
namely the budget balance model, the structural budget balance model and the 
cyclical budget balance model. Their estimates show that the variation of the 
actual budget balance was acyclical in the sample period, while the variation of 
the structural budget balance, or the discretionary fiscal policy, was counter-
cyclical. Thus, they claim that discretionary fiscal policy meets the stability 
condition, meaning that the years with expansionary policies were alternated with 
years of restrictive policies. However, their results show that the governments’ 
response to the economy’s cyclical fluctuations decreased along with adoption of 
the euro as a single currency because of the restrictions introduced by the Stability 
and Growth Pact.  
 
4.2.2 Automatic stabilizers 
Van den Noord (2000) investigates the role and the size of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. He defines automatic stabilizers as components of government budgets 
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that are affected by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate to smooth 
the business cycle. ‘Automatic stabilizers’ is another name for the cyclical 
component of the budget balance. He identifies the components as taxes and 
unemployment insurance. In times of recession fewer taxes will be collected and 
more unemployment insurance will be paid to support private incomes and 
stimulate the aggregated demand. In times of expansions more taxes will be 
collected and payments of unemployment insurance will decrease to counteract 
the aggregated demand. Van den Noord (2000, p. 4) states that the stabilizing 
property will be stronger if the tax system is more progressive. He points to the 
existence of other automatic stabilization mechanisms (such as financial markets), 
and calls the aforementioned automatic stabilizers for automatic fiscal stabilizers.  
 
Van den Noord (2000) underlines three cautions in the workings of automatic 
stabilizers. The author argues that if governments allow automatic stabilizers to 
work fully in downswings, but fail to resist the temptation to spend cyclical 
revenue increases during an upswing, the stabilizers may lead to bias towards 
weak structural budget positions. The result may be rises in public indebtedness 
during periods of cyclical weaknesses that are not subsequently reversed when 
activity recovers. This could lead to higher interest rates and will also require 
reduction in spending or a tax raise. Another caution is that automatic stabilizers 
respond to structural changes in the economic situation.  This may lead to a 
decline in the country’s growth potential, which may lead to a scenario in which 
automatic stabilizers undermine public finance positions. The final caution is that 
the tax and insurance systems serve other objectives as income security and 
redistribution. These systems may delay necessary adjustments in the wake of a 
recession (van den Nord, 2000, p. 5). Van den Noord assesses to what degree 
automatic stabilizers operate to smooth the business cycle in individual OECD 
countries. He finds that automatic fiscal stabilizers have generally reduced 
cyclical volatility in the 1990s. Further, he finds that some countries have 
undertaken fiscal consolidation to improve fiscal stabilizers. The government has 
then taken discretionary actions that have reduced or off-set the effect of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers.  
 
Fatás and Mihov (2000) also analyze the importance of automatic stabilizers on 
business cycle volatility. They use several measures of automatic stabilizers, such 
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as the size of government, and find that large governments are associated with less 
volatile business cycles. Disaggregating fiscal policy into different components, 
the authors find that changes in taxes, transfers and government employment are 
the most effective tools of fiscal policy when it comes to smoothing the business 
cycle. 
 
In his analysis on the degree fiscal policy functions as a stabilizing tool in the 
EMU, Dullien (2007) examines the role of automatic stabilizers as a part of fiscal 
policy (explained in chapter 4.2.1). Dullien states through econometric analyses 
that sizable automatic stabilizers exist in EMU. The econometric calculations 
shows that discretionary fiscal policy has counteracted the automatic stabilizers so 
that the overall fiscal policy has been acyclical or pro-cyclical.  Dullien proposes 
an EMU-wide unemployment scheme for further stabilization in the euro area. 
The study of Dinu et al. (2011) also confirms the role of the automatic stabilizers 
in stabilizing the cyclical fluctuations within the eurozone.  
 
4.2.3 Sovereign debt accumulation 
There are two ways of financing fiscal spending, either by borrowing money or 
through taxation (for instance via automatic stabilizers). The focus on financing 
sources has increased as the euro area is experiencing a sovereign debt8 crisis. 
Several authors have examined if one of the financing sources is more appropriate 
than the other. The phenomenon mostly studied is perhaps the well known 
Ricardian equivalence theorem, stating that the outcome of financing government 
spending either through taxes or debt will in the long term accrue equal costs.9 
Leith and von Thadden (2006) discuss the design of simple monetary and fiscal 
policy-rules consistence with determinate equilibrium dynamics. By adding an 
assumption of actors’ death in their model, and thus removing the presence of 
Ricardian equivalence, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which 
they claim needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics 
(Leith & von Thadden, 2006).  
                                                 
8
 Sovereign debt is the debt of the country, or debt of private consumers that is guaranteed by the 
country’s government. 
9
 This theory is criticized based on the assumption of perfect capital mobility, zero probability of 
death for the consumers, and no savings nor borrowing constraints on consumers, and that the 
consumers are willing to save for future taxes. 
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Dullien (2007) points to modern micro-founded models that have provided new 
rationale for the effectiveness of fiscal policies, including interest payments on 
sovereign debt. The author states that a number of models show that fiscal 
stabilization policy can be effective if households are liquidity-constrained and 
have limited access to unsecured loans. Thus, he argues that there exists empirical 
indication that the Ricardian equivalence theorem does not hold in its absolute 
form. In his analysis, Dullien removes the workings of interest payments and 
automatic stabilizers, and use the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance to 
find the discretionary policy. Dullien includes a measure of debt in his equation. 
By doing this he claims to include the debt level and thus policy makers’ concern 
about the overall level of public debt. He further argues that a cost of stabilization 
is that governments increase their debt in order to meet the Maastricht fiscal 
deficit criteria. Dullien claims the cost of government debt is to be borne by each 
government, which should weight its own benefits from stabilization against the 
costs of such a policy. He argues that rationally the government will decide for a 
degree of stabilization which is significantly lower than it would be optimal for 
the currency union as a whole.   
 
Interest payments are the result of the accrued sovereign debt and creditworthiness 
amongst creditors and other market actors. The sovereign debt trends detected in 
the last three decades suggest that the debt-to-GDP ratio has been increasing at a 
non-sustainable level for member states in the EMU (Gali & Perotti, 2003), 
(Lynn, 2011). The accrual of sovereign debt will in worst case scenario 
accumulate in a default if the country is not able to pay the interests. Hattenhouer 
(2000), in Gianviti et al. (2010), links accrual of sovereign debt to political 
judgement. Hattenhouer (2000) explains that the main asset of a sovereign debtor 
is its power and capacity to tax, which is an intangible asset in nature. Further, he 
argues that the economic value of this intangible asset depends on the degree of 
hardship a country’s citizens are willing to bear in order to service its debt and on the 
government’s administrative capacity to raise revenues. It has been argued that 
highly indebted countries benefit from euro area membership, in terms of lower 
interest rates paid on the countries’ public debt because the monetary union makes the 
commitment to low inflation more credible (Gianviti, Kruger, Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, & 
von Hagen, 2010). Unlike the membership of a monetary regime of national 
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currencies,10 sovereign default in a monetary union is more challenging because 
member states lack monetary policy autonomy. Gianviti et al. (2010) argue that 
by closing the inflation channel, monetary union leaves a country with only three 
ways out of a situation of excessive debt: severe and harmful fiscal retrenchment, 
default, or being bailed out by the other members of the monetary union. Gali and 
Perotti (2003) argue that the sovereign debt interest payments are largely outside 
the control of the incumbent fiscal authorities and is such not an expression of the 
current fiscal stance, but on earlier fiscal stances on accrual of sovereign debt. As 
such, they argue that interest payments are part of the discretionary policy which 
they find to influence business cycle volatility.  
 
4.3 Determinants of business cycle synchronization 
The literature on determinants of business cycle synchronization focuses mainly 
on the endogenous effects of monetary integration on the synchronization of 
business cycles; that is, if sharing a single currency may set in motion forces 
bringing countries’ economies closer together (De Grauwe & Mongelli, 2005). 
The implication for the euro area is that the euro area may over time turn into an 
optimum currency area even if it was not an OCA before. Countries which join or 
want to join the EMU may satisfy OCA properties ex-post even if they do not 
fulfill them ex-ante.  
 
4.3.1 Trade 
Frankel and Rose (1998) started the debate on the endogenous effect of monetary 
integration on the synchronization of business cycles by studying the effects of 
trade on business cycle synchronization. From a theoretical point of view, closer 
international trade could result in either tighter or looser correlation of business 
cycles. On the one hand, if the predominant shocks are demand shocks, or that 
intra-industry trade accounts for most trade, then shocks might be common across 
countries. This could lead to more similar business cycles. The effect suggested 
by this point of view applies mainly to intra-industry trade. On the other hand, 
closer trade could result in countries becoming more specialized in goods and 
services in which they have comparative advantages. The countries might be more 
sensitive to industry-specific shocks, which in turn could result in more 
                                                 
10
 Historically, European countries experienced most defaults during the Gold Standard. 
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idiosyncratic business cycles. The effect operates via inter-industry trade. This 
point of view is noted by inter alia Kenen (1969), Eichengreen (1992), and 
Krugman (1993).   
 
Frankel and Rose find the first point of view to be most realistic, but test the 
hypothesis on data. Using a panel of bilateral trade and business cycle spanning 
20 industrialized countries over 30 years, and conducting an instrumental analysis, 
they find that closer international trade links result in more closely correlated 
business cycles across countries. Thus, they argue that a monetary union itself, 
which is expected to boost trade integration, could increase business cycle 
synchronization. Frankel and Rose’s findings is an application of the well-known 
Lucas (1976) critique which casts doubt on macroeconomic models that try to 
predict the effects of a change in economic policy based on the relationships of 
observed historical data, not accounting for changes in policy. The Lucas critique 
enhances that macroeconomic models do not include structural parameters: when 
policy changes, the macroeconomic parameters will change as well. 
 
Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) use the same sample as Frankel and Rose (1998), 
however, instead of applying an instrumental analysis they apply an OLS-based 
estimation procedure. They also add structure-off-trade variables to their model 
measuring the impact of trade on business cycle synchronization in order to 
separate the effects of intra- and inter-industry trade flows. This allows them to 
test whether specialization reduces business cycle correlation. They find that 
specialization generally does not significantly asynchronize business cycles 
between two countries. Further, the authors’ results confirm Frankel and Rose’s 
general conclusion, but they suggest that Frankel and Rose model overestimates 
the effect of trade on business cycle synchronization.  
 
Imbs (2004) employs a simultaneous equations approach and instrumentation 
analysis. Analyzing data from the 1980s and the 1990s from 24 countries 
worldwide, he verifies the overall positive impact of trade on business cycle 
synchronization but points out that “a sizable portion is found to actually work 
through intra-industry trade” (Imbs J. , 2004, p. 733).  
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The results of Frankel and Rose (1998) are also confirmed by Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2005) who, among other variables, investigate the effect of trade on 
business cycle co-movements. Their dataset includes over 100 countries, both 
developed and developing. They use a “robustness” approach in which a variable 
is said to be a robust determinant of business cycle synchronization if the variable 
has a significant coefficient in all regressions when all other potential explanatory 
variables have had a chance to “knock the variable out of the equation” (Baxter & 
Kouparitsas, 2005, p. 114). They find that bilateral trade has an independent role 
in transmitting business cycles. 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001)  use a sample of 11 OECD countries 
to test the argument put forward by inter alia Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969), 
and Krugman (1993) that closer trade could lead to countries becoming more 
specialized. They empirically test whether countries that are more specialized are 
subject to less symmetric fluctuations. Their sample involves over 50 states, 
including ten OECD countries and the US. The sample period for sectoral GDP is 
1977-1990, and 1980-1990. The sample for total GDP used to identify fluctuation 
asymmetry is 1963-1993. They find that economic integration may lead to better 
income insurance through greater capital market integration, which in turn will 
induce higher specialization in production. Furthermore, they find that the OECD 
countries with higher industrial specialization exhibit output shocks that are less 
correlated on average with aggregate OECD output. The authors argue that their 
finding on specialization counterbalances the effect of lower trade-barriers on 
business cycle synchronization as found by Frankel and Rose (1998).  
 
4.3.2 Industrial similarity 
A second determinant of business cycle synchronization explored in literature is 
similarity in industrial structure. The theoretical argument states that industrial 
similarity is likely to affect the international synchronization of business cycles 
directly. This will occur in the presence of sector-specific shocks, as two 
economies producing the same types of goods or services will be subjected to 
similar developments (Imbs J. , 2004).  
 
Imbs (2004) finds that industrial similarity patterns have a sizable effect on 
business cycles as two economies with a similar economic structure are 
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significantly more correlated ceteris paribus. He shows that this happens mostly 
because economies grow through evolving stages of diversification. Most of the 
effect is independent of trade and financial policy, and directly reflects levels of 
GDP per capita. He argues that the importance of specialization patterns in 
affecting cycles is not due to his choice of a time period or geographic coverage, 
or to the prevalence of a given type of shock in a given sample.  
 
Also Calderón, Chong and Stein (2007) report that symmetric production 
structure result in correlated business cycles. They study differences of the impact 
of trade intensity on business cycle correlation between industrial and developing 
countries. Using annual information for 147 countries for the period 1960–99, 
they find that asymmetries in the structure of production explain approximately 
40% of the differences in the sensitivity of cycle correlation to trade intensity 
between industrial and developing country pair groups.   
 
Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) study a sample of 21 OECD countries in the 
period 1970–2003. They use three indicators of industrial similarity, namely 
measures based on industrial specialization, export similarity and the share of 
intra-industry trade, and find that all three measures appear robustly related to 
business cycle synchronization. Thus, they argue that since intra-industry trade 
has increased substantially in Europe, the “fit” of the common monetary policy 
has increased as the member countries’ business cycles have become more aligned 
(Haan, Inklaar, & Jong-A-Pin, 2008, p. 663). 
 
However, not all studies find industrial similarity to be significantly related to 
business cycle synchronization. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) also argue that if 
the primary business-cycle shocks are sector-specific, then countries with greater 
similarity in sectoral structure would tend to have more correlated business cycles. 
They include industrial similarity in their analysis to test their hypothesis 
empirically. Nevertheless, they do not find that sectoral similarity is robustly 
related to cycle co-movement.  
 
4.3.3 Financial integration 
Financial integration is a third field of determinants of business cycle 
synchronization. Financial integration is often studied in connection to trade and 
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industrial similarity, but it has been difficult to obtain sufficient measures of 
bilateral financial integration due to lack of information sources and data (Imbs J. 
, 2004). The impact of financial integration on cross-country business cycle 
synchronization has been considered ambiguous (Böwer & Guillemineau, 2006). 
On the one hand, international financial linkages could stimulate specialization 
through the reallocation of capital, and this could lead to less synchronization of 
business cycles. On the other hand, financial linkages could result in a higher 
degree of business cycle synchronization by generating large demand side effects. 
Also, contagion effects that are transmitted through financial linkages could result 
in heightened cross-country spillover effects of macroeconomic fluctuations 
(Haan, Inklaar, & Jong-A-Pin, 2008). Another argument is that limited ability to 
lend or borrow internationally hampers the transfers of resources across countries 
and can such increase GDP correlations (Imbs J. , 2004). Alternatively, if 
investors have imperfect information or face liquidity constraints, limiting capital 
flows can decrease GDP correlations, as investors herd or withdraw capital from 
destinations simultaneously (Imbs J. , 2004). Empirical work supports that capital 
flows are correlated internationally and that financial integration tends to 
synchronize business cycles (Imbs J. , 2004). 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001) include financial integration as an 
indirect measure in their study of the effect of increased trade on business cycle 
correlation (chapter 4.3.1). This is the first study in literature that finds a 
significant direct and positive effect of financial integration on business cycle 
synchronization (Imbs J. , 2004). The authors follow La Porta et al. (1998) who 
construct international data on several institutional determinants of financial 
development: indices of shareholders rights, indices of creditor rights and indices 
of enforcement laws. They argue that countries with a high degree of financial 
integration tend to have more specialized industrial patterns and less synchronized 
business cycles.  
 
Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) study the changes in world business cycles 
during the period 1960-2001 for the G7 countries. They employ a Bayesian 
dynamic latent factor model to estimate common components in the 
macroeconomic aggregates output, consumption, and investment. The authors 
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argue that financial integration enhances international spillovers of 
macroeconomic fluctuations leading to more business cycle synchronization.  
 
Imbs (2004) tests both the direct and the indirect link between financial 
integration and business cycle synchronization, the latter link working through the 
effect of specialization. His study covers 24 countries, both developing and 
developed from the 1980s and the 1990s. Imbs obtains a measure of bilateral 
financial integration through indices capturing restrictions on capital flows, and 
variables that reflect effective financial flows. Thus, Imbs obtain a measure of 
institutional determinants, and a measure of the financial flows. Imbs finds that 
correlations in GDP fluctuations rise with financial integration, even though 
financial integration tends to result in more specialized economies and thus less 
synchronized business cycles. He also finds a positive effect dominating the 
indirect link via specialization dynamics.  
 
4.3.4 Fiscal policy convergence  
Other studies explore the effect of fiscal policy convergence on synchronization of 
business cycles. Theoretically, fiscal convergence could raise business cycle 
synchronization by eliminating idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Most studies 
examining this issue employ fiscal policy variables in analyses exploring the 
effect of others determinants of business cycle synchronization (see for example 
Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Camacho, Perez-Quiros, and Saiz (2006), and 
Haan, Inklaar, and Jon-A-Pin (2008). Most of these studies find support that fiscal 
policy convergence leads to increased synchronization of business cycles.  
 
Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2007) employ a different methodology when 
considering the link between fiscal policy and business cycles. They ask whether 
there exists an indirect connection between the Maastricht criteria applied for 
EMU entry and the arguably most important OCA criteria, namely the 
synchronization business cycles. Using a panel of 21 OECD countries over 40 
years of annual data, they show that countries with divergent fiscal policies tend 
to have less synchronized business cycles. Darvas, Rose and Szapáry’s (2007) 
primary measure of fiscal divergence is the difference between countries in the 
general government budget deficit measured as a percentage of national GDP. The 
authors use the Pearson correlation coefficient as their dependent variable, and 
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define fiscal divergence as large average cross-country differences in the ratio of 
government net lending/borrowing to GDP (the general government deficit). To 
attain a measure of the deficit without impact of debt, the authors study the 
primary budget position. They show that convergence of both general government 
deficit and primary fiscal deficits tend to increase the level of business cycle 
synchronization. Thus, they conclude that the Maastricht convergence criteria, 
which have encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction, also have 
indirectly moved Europe closer to an OCA by reducing countries’ abilities to 
create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2007) mention that 
the Maastricht criteria may impose convergence of budget deficits at such low 
levels that fiscal convergence could reduce business cycle synchronization. They 
contradict this by arguing that fiscal convergence seems to increase business cycle 
synchronization by reducing volatile fiscal shocks (Darvas, Rose, & Szapáry, 
2007, p. 13). 
 
Artis, Fidrmuc and Scharler (2008) also find that countries with divergent fiscal 
policies are subject to idiosyncratic business cycles. They use a different 
dependent variable, namely Fisher’s transformation of the standard correlation 
coefficient11, while applying average cross-country differences in the cyclically 
adjusted fiscal balances as measures of fiscal divergence. In addition, they control 
for other measures of integration such as labor market rigidities as well as trade 
and FDI links between countries. Their dataset consists of 10 euro area countries 
and 5 countries outside the euro area. Focusing on the six new member states of 
the EU (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 
considering implications for EMU enlargement, they suggest that the Maastricht 
fiscal criteria should give rise to additional synchronization effects due to more 
convergent fiscal policies. Thus, the authors partially confirm an optimistic view 
towards the monetary integration of the new EU member states.  
 
Haan, Inklaar, and Jon-A-Pin (2008) find that convergence in fiscal policies has a 
similar impact on business cycle synchronization as trade intensity. Their paper 
examines data from 21 OECD countries in the period 1970-2003, and estimates a 
multivariate model including variables capturing similarity of economic policies. 
                                                 
11
 Fisher’s transformation of the standard correlation coefficient: ½ ln [(1+ρij) / (1-ρij], where ρij is 
the correlation coefficient between the countries i and j. 
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Their results suggest a sustainable EMU because of the integration process in 
which inter alia fiscal policies have become more similar in Europe. 
 
Lan and Sylwester (2010) follow the same approach as Darvas, Rose and Szapáry, 
but they examine to what extent Chinese provinces with similar fiscal policies 
have synchronous business cycles. Lan and Sylwester study 27 of 31 Chinese 
provinces, and use annual data from 1966-2003, which again is divided in three 
sub-periods. They instrument for fiscal policy using government expenditure on 
cultural activities because causation can run from both fiscal policy to output 
fluctuations and from output fluctuations to fiscal policy. Their results show that 
provinces with similar budgetary positions tend to have similar business cycle 
movements, and thus, they suggest that fiscal policy could be a source of business 
cycle fluctuations. 
 
5. Hypotheses 
This thesis measures fiscal behavior in terms of the Maastricht fiscal criteria. The 
first criterion is the deficit-to-GDP ratio. In this thesis, we measure the impact of 
deficit by dividing the deficit in two components: a structural component and a 
cyclical component. The second criterion measures the debt-to-GDP ratio. We 
measure impact of debt indirectly by distinguishing between primary deficit and 
interest payments.  Our four hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: DIVERGENCE OF STRUCTURAL DEFICIT BETWEEN TWO EMU 
COUNTRIES HAS A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF 
THESE COUNTRIES’ BUSINESS CYCLES. 
H2: DIVERGENCE OF CYCLICAL DEFICIT BETWEEN TWO EMU 
COUNTRIES HAS A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF 
THESE COUNTRIES’ BUSINESS CYCLES. 
H3: DIVERGENCE OF PRIMARY DEFICIT BETWEEN TWO EMU 
COUTNRIES HAS A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF 
THESE COUNTRIES’ BUSINESS CYCLES. 
H4: DIVERGENCE OF INTEREST PAYMENTS BETWEEN TWO EMU 
COUNTRIES HAS A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF 
THESE COUNTRIES’ BUSINESS CYCLES.  
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6. Methodology 
6.1 Qualitative preparatory study 
As part of our study, we have conducted a qualitative analysis of articles about the 
euro and the eurozone in four well-recognized journals in political economy from 
1990-2010. The four revised journals were European Union Politics, International 
Organization, Journal of European Public Policy, and Journal of Common Market 
Studies. The distribution of articles revised can be found in appendix 1. The 
findings and conclusions from the article review have formed an understanding of 
challenges and dynamics of the EMU, and thereby functioned as a base for the 
quantitative study. 
 
6.2 Measuring business cycles 
6.2.1 Measures of business cycles 
The two most important variables used when measuring business cycles are 
quarterly data on GDP and monthly data on industrial production (IP). Annual 
data are usually avoided to capture more of the high frequency fluctuations. Haan, 
Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) argue that GDP is the most appropriate variable 
because studies of business cycle synchronization should focus on the broadest 
possible output variable. Unfortunately quarterly real GDP data are not available 
for many countries on a long-term basis. We use quarterly data of GDP with 
constant 2000 prices for the period 1980-2010 for 16 of the 17 current member 
states of the EMU12, and for three EU countries which do not use the euro as their 
currency, namely Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.13 Sweden has no 
more than derogation from participation in stage 3 of EMU, while Denmark and 
the UK have an opt-out, however still under the obligation of complying with 
regulations in the SGP.14 Data of quarterly GDP used to calculate the dependent 
variable is collected through Datastream, from the Eurostat database.  
                                                 
12
 Estland is excluded due to limited access to data for this country.   
13
 Denmark has not introduced the euro. The EU Treaty gives Denmark the right to remain outside 
the euro area, even when all convergence criteria are met (opt-out). However, the Danish krone 
has joined the ERM II and observes a central rate of 746.038 to the euro with narrow fluctuation 
margins of ±2.25%. The Swedish krona is not yet within the ERM II, but Sweden is obliged to join 
the euro once it meets the necessary conditions. The UK has negotiated and opt-out from the euro, 
and the pound sterling is not included in ERM II. The United Kingdom entered the ERM in 
October 1990, but was forced to exit the programme within two years (The European Commission, 
2011). 
14
 Regulation 1467/97 establishing the SGP states that paragraph 1 of article 104 in the TEC – 
“Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits” – does not apply to the UK, however, 
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6.2.2 Filtering methods 
This thesis focuses on the growth cycle. The task of business (growth) cycle 
theory is to explain the fluctuations around a time trend. A problem with the hard-
data series is that they do not provide a measure of “the business cycle” as such, 
but first have to be decomposed into trend and cycles using statistical techniques. 
There is no single ‘correct’ way of separating the cyclical component of a variable 
measuring business cycles. We need a method which allows for variation over 
time in the underlying growth trend, but which nevertheless ensures that the short-
term fluctuations are categorized as temporary cyclical deviations from the trend. 
 
In this thesis, we employ two well-known filtering methods: a band pass filter 
developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (CF filter), and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter. Both methods are nonparametric, meaning that they are not based on a 
specified statistical model. Researchers have come to different conclusions about 
whether the choice of filtering methods is crucial for the conclusions.15 One 
feasible solution is to assess the robustness of the results by comparing the 
outcome of a number of filtering methods. We use the CF filter to our default 
estimations, but employ the HP filter to check for robustness.  
 
The Christiano-Fitzgerald filter (a band pass filter) 
A band pass filter is a filter that separates elements with fluctuations within a 
specified band of frequencies and elements with fluctuations outside this band. 
The “ideal” band pass filter can be used to isolate the component of a time series 
that lies within this specified band of frequencies. The band pass filter is 
preferable from a theoretical point of view since it intends to eliminate both high 
frequency fluctuations and low frequency fluctuations (Darvas & Szapáry, 2008). 
However, applying this filter requires a dataset of infinite length. In practice, an 
approximation is needed. Here, we roughly present two approximations, and 
choose to proceed with the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
it fails to state explicitly that it does not apply to Denmark. The 2002 Council opinion on the 
updates convergence programme for Denmark states that “Denmark is also expected to be able to 
withstand a normal cyclical downturn without breaching the 3% of GDP deficit reference value”. 
The UK is still under the obligation of paragraph 4 of article 116 stating that “In the second stage, 
Member States shall endeavor to avoid excessive deficits” (Gali & Perotti, 2003, pp. 7-8) 
15
 See for example Canova (1994), Artis and Zhang (1997) or Massmann and Mitchell (2004). 
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The mostly commonly used band pass filter is the filter developed by Baxter and 
King. Baxter and King (1999) criticized the HP filter stating that the technique 
resulted from a lack of attention to the definition of a business cycle. They 
proposed a new filter, the derivation of which is explicitly based on six 
requirements16 and a moving average. Their filter assumes symmetric weights, 
which means it needs K observations at the beginning and end of the series to 
approximate the ideal band pass filter. Baxter and King recommend using a 12 
quarter moving average. This leads to a loss of three years of data in both ends of 
the time series. This is the Baxter and King filter’s most serious shortcoming.  
 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) developed a generalized version of Baxter and 
King’s band pass filter. In their manuscript, they describe an algorithm to 
approximate the ideal band pass filter. They assume that the unfiltered time series 
have a unit root and that data are generated by a random walk, and find that this 
simple approach is “nearly optimal” (Christiano & Fitzgerald, 2003). In the 
compilation of the filter, Christiano and Fitzgerald use this minimization function 
as a starting point: 
E{(yt - ŷt)2|x}, x ≡ [x1,…,xT].  
 
Based on this, they construct a filter of which the filtering vectors is set in such a 
way that the mean squared error between the ideal filter (yt) and the approximate 
filter (ŷt) is minimized given the raw data. An important characteristic of the CF 
filter is that they allow for the filter weight to be changed over time because this 
increases the amount of information in the data used to estimate the filter.  
 
The differences between Baxter and King’s filter and the CF filter are due to the 
type of approximation of the ideal band pass filter as they differ in two 
assumptions (Evans, 2006). Firstly, Baxter and King assume that the variables are 
independent and identically distributed, while Christiano and Fitzgerald presume 
the distribution of a random walk. Secondly, Baxter and King assume symmetric 
weights, whereas Christiano and Fitzgerald omit this assumption. Evans (2006) 
                                                 
16
 Following their logic, a useful detrending method should fulfill six requirements: (1) the filter 
should extract a cyclical component within a specified range of periodicities, and leave the 
characteristics of this component undistorted, (2) there should be no phase shift, (3) the filter 
should be an optimal approximation to the “ideal” filter, (4) the filter should have trend-reducing 
properties, (5) the filter should yield business cycle components unrelated to the length of the 
observation period, and (6) the method must be operational. 
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concludes that the filter by Baxter and King is a better approximation when it 
comes to shorter business cycles, while the filter by Christiano and Fitzgerald is 
better when dealing with longer business cycles. In addition, he concludes that it 
is advisable to employ the filter by Christiano and Fitzgerald if the characteristics 
of the cycles towards the ends of the data series are of particular interest.  
 
As we prefer to make use of data from the whole sample period, we prefer the CF 
filter to the filter developed by Baxter and King. We employ not-seasonally 
adjusted time series for the CF filter because this filter is constructed to remove 
seasonally variations. When the business cycle is specified within a certain band 
of periodicities, it results in a two-sided moving average. In order to remove both 
low and high frequency components the weights of two low pass filters are 
applied. Upper and lower frequencies of the two filters are by Baxter and King 
(1999) recommended to be set to 8 and 1.5 years, respectively. In this thesis, we 
will translate the frequencies to quarterly data and set them to 32 and 6 quarters. 
 
The Hodrick-Prescott filter 
The HP filter is named after the American economists Robert Hodrick and 
Edward Prescott (1997). They define a time series (yt) as the sum of the trend 
component (gt) and the cyclical component (ct).  
yt = gt + ct  
The main advantage of the HP filter is that it is easy to employ because it simply 
solves the following problem: 
          T                               T-1 
min {∑ (yt –gt)2 + λ∑[( gt+1 - gt) – (gt – gt-1)]2}, 
         
t=1
                   
t=2 
where yt is the log of GDP at constant prices in period t, gt is the log of the growth 
component (trend), and λ is a smoothing parameter. The magnitudes gt+1 - gt and 
gt – gt-1 are approximately the percentage growth rates of the trend value of real 
GDP in periods t+1 and t, respectively. The term in the square bracket thus 
measures the change in the estimated trend growth rate from one period to the 
next. The term yt –gt measures the cyclical component, ct, of log (GDP) in period 
t. 
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The HP filter is based on the assumption that the seasonal component is already 
removed. Using data that is not seasonally adjusted may result in a volatile 
cyclical component because the filter is not able to remove these short term 
fluctuations. Thus, we use seasonally adjusted GDP when applying the HP filter. 
Additionally to its simplicity, the HP filter has other advantages, such as the 
ability to compute a good approximation of the cyclical component and the 
capacity to deal with the high and low frequencies of series (Silva, 2009). 
However, researchers have found that the HP filter has some problems. The filter 
is a two-way filter, i.e. it uses information from t-1, t and t+1 to determine the 
trend in period t. Consequently, the filter tends to give imprecise estimates of the 
trend at the end-point series. Some business cycle researchers therefore exclude 
the first and the last 12 estimated cyclical components of all quarterly time series 
(Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). We choose to use all estimated cyclical 
components in our analysis, but keep in mind that the end-points may give biased 
results. 
 
Another critique of the procedure is that it is derived without any theoretical 
justification. The researcher needs to choose the value of the smoothing parameter 
λ, and the results are thus affected by this.17 For this investigation λ = 1600, since 
it is the recommended value for quarterly data. 
 
In addition, researchers have criticized the assumption that upturns and downturns 
evens out in the long run. This means that positive and negative deviations are 
given the same weight, an assumption that is not necessarily true. A last critique 
of the filter is that it is poor in handling long cycles. A cyclical downturn which is 
longer than normal will result in negative adjustment of the trend growth. The 
success of the HP filter is thus dependent on how long the cycles are assumed to 
last. 
 
Comparison of filters 
In order to compare the results produced by the two filtering methods presented 
above, we compute correlation analysis between the same cycles computed with 
the CF filter and the HP filter (table 1). 
                                                 
17
 See for example Giorno et al. (1995) for more on this issue. 
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CF AND HP FILTERS 
  
Austria Belgium Cyprus Finland France Germany Greece 
0,624*** 0,792*** 0,724*** 0,688*** 0,736*** 0,856*** 0,720*** 
  
     
  
Ireland  Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia 
0,700*** 0,863*** 0,744*** 0,738*** 0,683*** 0,556*** 0,663*** 
  
     
  
Slovenia Spain Denmark Sweden UK 
 
  
0,798*** 0,797*** 0,790*** 0,274* 0,193*     
† p <0.1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
The filters are significantly and positively correlated for all countries, however the 
correlation coefficient is relatively low for Sweden and the UK. Nevertheless, we 
proceed, as planned, with the CF filter when calculating the dependent variable. 
Graphs of the business cycles obtained with the HP filter and the CF filter are to 
be found in appendix 2. 
 
6.3 Quantitative study 
Our quantitative study aims to detect whether fiscal policy convergence is a 
determinant of business cycle synchronization. We use a panel data set of 19 
countries from the years 1980-2010, implying that we include more recent data 
than earlier studies in this area. The panel data set combines time-series and cross-
sectional data. This increases our sample size, and it gives us the opportunity to 
analyze both the time variation and the cross-country variation in our data. All 
variables in our analyses are defined as bilateral relationships over three periods: 
1980-1990, 1991-1999, and 2000-2010. The dividing of time periods is done in 
order to capture a pre-Maastricht convergence period, a post-Maastricht pre-euro 
period, and a post-euro period. The most interesting split is between 1999 and 
2000 because the euro was introduced in 1999. The splitting up of periods takes 
into account that sub-samples of smaller size than eight years are indeed less 
likely to capture a full business cycle (Böwer & Guillemineau, 2006) because the 
business cycles in several European countries seem to last up to eight years 
(Agresti & Mojon, 2001). Consequently, we are left with a maximum sample size 
of 513 observations [(19x18)/2)x3 periods]. In practice, the dataset has many gaps 
because of lacking data. 
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6.3.1 Empirical framework 
Our general empirical framework follows that of Frankel and Rose (1998) who 
focused on the endogeneity of business cycle synchronization with respect to 
trade. We want to test whether more convergent fiscal policy causes more 
synchronized business cycles in the euro area. In theory, the relationship may be 
two-ways (Darvas, Rose, & Szapáry, 2007). On the one hand, fiscal policy 
divergence may be a response to asymmetric shocks, and thus may lead to more 
synchronized business cycles because fiscal policies then smooth economic 
fluctuations. On the other hand, fiscal policy may cause shocks. If this is the case, 
fiscal policy divergence leads to less synchronized business cycles. A last 
possibility is that there is no coherence between fiscal policy convergence and 
business cycle synchronization. The question is empirical, and we want to test it 
on data. 
 
The benchmark regressions we estimate take the form: 
 
Business cycle synchronizationijt =  β0 + β1fiscal policy divergenceijt + εijt, 
 
where business cycle synchronizationijt is the correlation of business cycles 
between country i and j in period t, fiscal policy divergence is a measure of 
divergence of fiscal policies between country i and j in period t, and εijt is assumed 
to be independent identically-distributed. The object of interest is the slope 
coefficient β1. A negative estimate of β1 indicates that an increase in fiscal 
divergence is associated with reduced business cycle coherence, meaning that an 
increase in fiscal convergence is associated with increased business cycle 
coherence.  
 
6.3.2 Dependent variable 
Various methods have been proposed in the literature to investigate the issue of 
business cycle synchronization. Business cycles are synchronized if their turning 
points occur at either roughly the same points in time or differ by intervals that are 
roughly constant, meaning that the turning points “cluster together”.  One possible 
approach is to look at the evolution of the standard deviation of EMU countries’ 
business cycles over time (Gayer 2007). Due to this measure’s scale-dependency, 
it is poorly suited to measure the genuine synchronization dimension of business 
cycle convergence. Other measures, such as dynamic correlation, phase-adjusted 
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correlation, and a concordance index, have also been proposed (Haan, Inklaar and 
Jong-A-Pin 2008). This thesis uses bilateral Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the cycles of countries i and j in the period t. The use of a correlation 
coefficient as the dependent variable in models examining the determinants of 
business cycle synchronization may lead to complications because the dependent 
variable lies between −1 and 1. Thus, the error terms in a regression model of the 
determinants of business cycle synchronization are likely not to be normally 
distributed. Evidence presented by Otto et al. (2001) suggests that it is necessary 
to transform the dependent variable. Consequently, as in Artis, Fidrmuc and 
Scharler (2008), we use Fisher’s transformation of the standard correlation 
coefficient: ½ ln [(1+ρijt) / (1-ρijt], where ln is the natural logarithm and ρijt is the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between two countries in period t. If the 
observations used to calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient has a bivariate 
normal distribution, then Fisher’s transformation is approximately normally 
distributed.18 
 
A statistical issue is how to judge the change in co-movement between cycles 
over time. One approach is to use rolling windows as in Massmann and Mitchell 
(2004). This method has some drawbacks because of an assumption of a 
monotone development of correlations over time (Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin 
2008). The simplest solution is to compare correlations in two periods, or for 
multiple periods as in Inklaar and De Haan (2001). Accordingly, this thesis will 
compare correlations over the three periods 1980-1990, 1991-1999, and 2000-
2010, as presented in chapter 6.3.  
 
6.3.3 Independent variables 
We have four independent variables measuring fiscal policy divergence. The 
independent variables are derived from the EDP in the SGP. Firstly, we 
distinguish between structural and cyclical deficit based on an OECD method for 
calculating the cyclical components.19 Secondly, we distinguish between primary 
                                                 
18
 Appendix 3 presents frequency distributions of the correlation coefficient and the transformed 
correlation coefficient, confirming that the transformed correlation coefficient is closer to be 
normally distributed.  
19
 An explanation of the method used to derive cyclical adjustments of budget balances is provided 
in Appendix 4. 
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deficit and interest payments.20 Data on the countries’ budget balances is gathered 
from the Annual Macro-Economic (AMECO) database of the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN).  
 
The first independent variable is divergence of cyclically adjusted deficit, also 
called the structural deficit. The structural deficit, here the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance, gives the value of GDP when cyclical components are removed. 
In this thesis this is a measure of the fiscal stance taken by the policy maker, or 
discretionary fiscal policy, and is therefore said to make out a structural 
component. Structural deficit divergence will be measured between country i and 
country j during sub-period t as differences in structural deficit, as in Darvas, 
Rose and Szapáry (2007). 
Structural deficit divergence ijt ≡ 1/t*∑(|structural deficitit – structural 
deficitjt|) 
 
The second independent variable is divergence of cyclical deficit. The cyclical 
deficit consists of cyclical components of revenue and expenditure, variations 
explained by business cycle fluctuations in unemployment and the tax bases. In 
this thesis this is a measure of automatic fiscal stabilizers. The cyclical deficit will 
be measured between country i and country j during sub-period t as differences in 
cyclical deficit: 
Cyclical deficit divergenceijt ≡ 1/t*∑(|cyclical deficitit – cyclical deficitjt|) 
 
The third independent variable is divergence of primary deficit. The primary 
deficit measured by the EDP is the budget deficit excluding interest payments, 
and thus makes a measure of the national deficit without the impact of 
accumulated debt. In this thesis this is seen as a measure of general fiscal policies. 
Primary deficit divergence will be measured between country i and country j 
during sub-period t as differences in primary deficit.  
Primary deficit divergence
 ijt ≡ 1/t*∑(|primary deficitit – primary deficitjt|) 
 
                                                 
20
 Appendix 5 provides Eurostat’s guidelines for the measurement of the two SGP-criteria, and 
measurement of interest payments. 
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The fourth variable is divergence of interest payments. Data on interest payments 
is obtained by deducting the primary deficit from the general government deficit 
under the EDP. In this thesis, interest payments are used as a proxy of 
accumulated debt under the assumption that interest remains constant.21 Interest 
payments divergence will be measured between country i and country j during 
sub-period t as differences in interest payments. 
Interest payments divergenceijt ≡ 1/t*∑(|Interestsit – Interestsjt|) 
 
Data used to compute the independent variables is expressed as percentage of 
GDP. A larger value of the variables means a higher average divergence between 
the fiscal positions of the two member states. Thus, we expect a negative effect of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable. We will use the averages in 
the three subperiods 1980-1990, 1991-1999, and 2000-2010.  
 
6.3.4 Control variables 
We include several control variables in our analysis. These are variables that in 
previous studies have been seen as important determinants of business cycle 
synchronization. As our sample principally consists of EMU countries, we do not 
add monetary integration as a control variable in our analysis.22  
 
Trade intensity 
The first control variable is bilateral trade in goods. Bilateral trade is measured as 
bilateral trade intensity. We will use international trade data from the IMF 
database Direction of Trade. All data is provided in millions of US dollars. IMF 
follows UN guidelines when defining what constitute imports and exports: 
Imports shall be valued at the cost, insurance, freight transaction value at the 
frontier of the importing country, and export shall be valued at the free on board 
transaction value at the frontier of the exporting country (ESDS International, 
2011). However, diversity exists among countries in valuation and definitions 
used, and in methods of obtaining value information. As in Frankel and Rose 
(1998), we will measure bilateral trade intensity between countries i and j at point 
                                                 
21
 A possible bias in our results is that interest payments are influenced by a variable interest. 
22
 Including monetary integration as a control variable could create variation over time, but limited 
cross-country variation. 
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t in time. The bilateral trade intensities are normalized by total trade data23 for 
countries i and j, and measure how connected in trade a country is to one country 
relative to another country: 
Trade intensityijt = (Xijt + Mijt) / (Xit + Xjt + Mit + Mjt). 
Xijt denotes export from country i to j in period t, Mijt denotes import from country 
j to i in sub-period t. Xit and Xjt denotes total export for respectively country i and 
j in sub-period t. Mit and Mjt denotes total import for respectively country i and j 
in sub-period t. Measuring the bilateral trade, we will use the average of the two-
way exports between a country pair to reduce possible problems with under-
reported intra-EU imports and over-reported intra-EU exports due to VAT fraud 
(Baldwin, Frankel, & Melitz, 2006). One should expect a positive effect of Trade 
intensityijt on business cycle synchronization.  
 
Industrial similarity 
The second control variable is industrial similarity. There are no standard 
measures of similarity in industry specialization. Imbs (2001) uses a correlation 
coefficient between sectoral shares in aggregate output or employment, whereas 
Krugman (1991) and Clark and Wincoop (2001) use a variable akin to the 
Herfindahl index of concentration. In this thesis, we employ the methodology of 
Imbs (2004). Sectoral real value added is used to compute 
        N 
Industrial similiarityijt = 1/T ∑ ∑ │Isni - Isnj│, 
            t
   
n
 
where Isni denotes the GDP share of industry n in country i, and snj denotes the 
GDP share of industry n in country j. Industrial similarityijt is the time average of 
the discrepancies in the economic structures of countries i and j in sub-period t. 
Consequently, the value of Industrial similarityijt reaches its maximal value for 
two countries with no sector in common. One should therefore expect a negative 
effect of Industrial similarityijt on business cycle correlation.  
 
We employ the STAN indicators 2009 from the OECD Structural Analysis 
Statistics (STAN) Database. The database does not have data for Cyprus and 
Malta. The sectors utilized in the composition of the variable are: (1) agriculture, 
                                                 
23
 One alternative is to normalize bilateral trade intensity by GDP. This measures how connected 
in trade two countries are relative to their specific economies. In this paper we choose to normalize 
by total trade to exclude other components of the economies. 
Master Thesis - GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
Page 37 
hunting, forestry and fishing, (2) mining and quarrying, (3) manufacturing, (4) 
electricity, gas and water supply, (5) construction, (6) wholesale and retail trade – 
restaurants and hotels, (7) transport, storage and communications, (8) finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services, and (9) community, social and 
personal services.  
 
Financial integration 
The Frankel and Rose empirical framework for measuring bilateral trade has been 
applied to measure financial bilateral integration (Imbs J. , 2006). Due to much 
difficulty measuring effective financial integration, partly caused by lack of 
relevant data, researchers have used different proxies, such as balance of 
payments and risk sharing. To capture a measure of financial integration, we will 
use Imbs (2004) categorization of proxies. He distinguishes between two proxies; 
the first proxy concerns restrictions on capital flows, and the other proxy concerns 
effective financial flows.  
 
To measure restrictions on capital flows (capital controls), we follow Miniane’s 
(2004) empirical framework (appendix 6). Miniane measures restrictions on 
capital accounts by using information provided from the IMF in the Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). We 
use 14 capital controls, and the controls are given a value of 1 if they exist, and 0 
if they do not exist. The capital controls are summed for each country each year, 
and the calculations make out a restriction index. The restriction indices are then 
summed pair wise, and report the average number of countries with restrictions to 
financial flows, for each country pair over period t (Imbs J. , 2006). Miniane 
provides data from 1983 to 2000 on the 14 of the countries in our analysis24. 
Based on Miniane’s methodology we extend the dataset in terms of countries and 
years. We extend the dataset to the year 2008, which is the latest year with 
available data. We also provide data on the remaining countries Cyprus, Ireland, 
Malta, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Due to lack of time, the data series on these 
countries start respectively in 1994, 1993, 1995, 1995 and 1995. Data for 
Luxembourg exists from 1996. We expect a negative effect of capital controls on 
business cycle synchronization. 
                                                 
24
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and the UK 
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To measure effective financial flows Imbs (2004) uses data on bilateral holdings. 
This is provided by IMF in the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). 
The available data is from 2001-2009, meaning that we only have available data 
for the last period in our analysis. This makes it impossible to conduct fixed 
effects analyses. Consequently, we only use capital controls as a proxy for 
financial integration in this thesis. This may constitute a weakness in the measure 
of financial integration. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the variables in our analysis: 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
Concept: Operationalization: Source of data: Expected 
value of 
parameter: 
      
Business cycle 
synchronization 
(dependent 
variable) 
Phillips 
transformation of 
correlation coefficient, 
CF filtered quarterly 
GDP data 
Eurostat   
      
Structural deficit 
divergence 
Divergence of 
cyclically adjusted 
(structural 
component) budget 
position 
AMECO Negative 
      
Cyclical deficit 
divergence 
Divergence of cyclical 
component of budget 
position 
AMECO Negative 
      
Primary deficit 
divergence 
Divergence of primary 
deficit 
AMECO Negative 
      
Interest payments 
divergence 
Divergence of interest 
payments 
AMECO Negative 
      
Trade intensity Bilateral trade 
intensity 
IMF Direction of Trade 
Database 
Positive 
      
Industrial similarity  Sectoral real value 
added 
OECD Structural Analysis 
Statistics Database 
Negative 
      
Financial 
integration 
Capital account 
restrictions 
IMF's Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange 
Restrictions 
Negative 
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6.4 Econometric issues 
Our model may suffer from endogeneity bias, which occurs when the independent 
variable is correlated with the error term in a regression model (Wooldridge, 
2009). Roughly speaking, a loop of causality between the independent and the 
dependent variables of a model leads to endogeneity. In our model, fiscal policy 
may be endogenous because politicians change their policies in response to the 
business cycle. This implies that the regression coefficient in a simple OLS 
regression is biased. Endogeneity may be caused by various sources, the most 
important being measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity. 
 
The measurement error problem can be viewed as a data problem: we cannot 
obtain direct data on the variables of interest. If one uses an imprecise measure of 
an economic variable in a regression model, then our model contains 
measurement error (Wooldridge, 2009). In our model, an important econometric 
problem results from the fact that we do not observe the true cross-country 
business cycle correlation, Yij, but instead must use estimated correlations, Ŷij, 
which may contain measurement error (Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2005). 
Additionally, the dependent variable may contain measurement error due to 
weaknesses of the filter used to obtain the business cycles. If the measurement 
error in the dependent variable is correlated with the independent variables, then 
OLS estimation could be biased. Our model could also suffer from measurement 
error in the independent variables due to imprecise measure of fiscal convergence. 
There may be non-trivial measurement error in fiscal divergence (especially since 
measuring the general government budget position itself seems difficult).  
 
If we omit a variable that actually belongs in the true model, our model may suffer 
from omitted variable bias. If an explanatory variable is correlated with an 
omitted variable this will lead to bias. The amount of the bias depends on the size 
of the omitted variable’s coefficient and the correlation among the explanatory 
variables and between the explanatory variables and the omitted variable 
(Wooldridge, 2009). This is likely to be the case in our model as there is likely to 
be heterogeneity influencing bilateral business cycle correlation that is not 
explained by our independent variables. 
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Simultaneity arises when one or more of the explanatory variables are jointly 
determined with the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2009). When x is partly 
determined by y, x is generally also correlated with the error term, so simultaneity 
meets the definition of endogeneity. Simultaneity is a potential worry in our 
model. For example, for some exogenous reason a high-deficit country decides to 
engage in long-term fiscal consolidation. If this leads to a recession, ceteris 
paribus, we might expect fiscal convergence to coincide with lower business 
cycle synchronization, at least over a short period of time. Alternatively, if a high-
deficit country decides to engage in fiscal consolidation and convergence 
simultaneously the effect goes the opposite way (Darvas, Rose, & Szapáry, 2007).  
 
In sum, our model may suffer from endogeneity bias caused by measurement 
error, omitted variables and simultaneity. One possible method used to reduce 
endogeneity problems is to use instrumental variable (IV) techniques. However, 
this is not necessarily advisable, especially since finding applicable instrument is a 
challenge. Rodrick (2000) points out that for an instrument to be valid, it is not 
enough that it be exogenous and related to the endogenous explanatory variable 
(instrument relevance). It must also affect the outcome variable only through the 
variable instrumented and be uncorrelated with the omitted variables (instrument 
exogeneity). Failing to fulfill with the criteria of instrument exogeneity may lead 
to too large estimates due to a statistical association between the instrumental and 
omitted variables (which would be part of the error term). Thus, performing and 
IV analysis can result in a bias greater than that from OLS (Gruben, Koo, & 
Millis, 2002). Earlier researchers have employed both OLS and IV techniques 
when testing the affect of fiscal policy convergence on business cycle 
synchronization. Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2007) find that the results from OLS 
and IV are consistent, and also show that the results are insensitive to the exact 
choice of instrumental variables. But the quantitative IV results are approximately 
four times larger.  
 
Consequently, we aim to reduce bias caused by endogeneity in other ways than 
including instrumental variables. To make progress on the measurement error 
problem, we include different robustness checks. Additionally, we make an 
assumption about the specific form of the measurement error in specifying a 
fixed-effects model. By allowing for time-invariant fixed effects to our model, we 
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also partly eliminate the bias caused by omitted variables. However, since there 
will be a time varying residual in the error, the results may still be biased 
(Baldwin, Frankel, & Melitz, 2006). Therefore, we further mitigate the omitted 
variable bias by including the control variables in our model. These variables are 
variables related to the unobserved variables that we would like to control for in 
our analysis. This is called the plug-in solution to the omitted variables problem 
(Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
6.5 Multivariate analyses 
6.5.1 Pooled OLS estimates 
We start the multivariate analyses by running a regression over all the data using 
simple ordinary least squares. Hence, we pool all the data together and do not 
make any distinction between cross section and time series. This type of 
regression is the most straightforward to run, but may also be subject to several 
sources of estimation bias, as discussed above. However, pooled OLS is often 
used as a simple benchmark to which more sophisticated models can be 
compared. 
 
Hypotheses H1 through H4 are tested in two equations in the OLS model: 
 
(1) Yijt = β0 + β1Structural deficit divergenceijt + β2Cyclical deficit 
divergenceijt + β3Z + εijt, 
(2) Yijt = β0 + β1Primary deficit divergenceijt + β2Interest payments 
divergenceijt + β3Z + εijt, 
 
where Yijt is the transformed correlation coefficient between country i and j in 
period t, Z is a vector of the different control variables, and εijt is the error term. 
 
6.5.2 Basic Linear Unobserved Effects Model 
OLS assumes no individual heterogeneity. Employing panel data, however, allows 
us to consider more flexible models than the simple pooled OLS model.  In 
particular, we can employ the fixed effects (FE) or the random effects (RE) 
model, where we assume that the constant term for bilateral relationships differs. 
We can write this as  
yijt = β0 + β1xijt + aij + eijt,  
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where εijt = aij + eijt. Each aij is then a separate constant associated with a different 
bilateral relationship. We would like to hold aij constant when obtaining partial 
effects of the observable explanatory variables. This means that the actual 
constant term for each bilateral relationship is equal to β0 + aij or, if omitting β0 
from the model, just aij. The assumption that aij is constant over time, and has a 
constant partial effect over time, is crucial to the following analysis (Wooldridge, 
2010). The FE model treats aij as a variable that is partially correlated with the 
observed regressors. The RE model treats aij as independently distributed of the 
regressors. The main question to ask when deciding which of the two methods to 
use is whether the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated in one or more of the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010). If aij is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, RE will be more efficient. Random effects assume that the 
entity’s error term is not correlated with the predictors which allows for time-
invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. If aij is correlated with 
the explanatory variables, RE will be biased but FE consistent. When using FE we 
assume that something within the individual may impact or bias the predictor or 
outcome variables and we need to control for this. FE removes the effect of those 
time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables so we can assess the 
predictors’ net effect. Running the Hausman test for the two OLS models gives us 
a chi square value of 78.1257, and 57.9787, respectively. The tests reject the 
hypothesis that the random effects model is best for our equations, thus, we 
continue with the fixed effects model. 
 
6.5.3 The Fixed Effects Model 
The fixed effect model is a method of estimating panel data equations that works 
by allowing each cross-sectional unit to have different intercept (Studenmund 
2011). The model assists in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between 
countries when this heterogeneity is constant over time and potentially correlated 
with independent variables. We remove this constant from the data by making a 
dummy variable for ((19*18)/2) - 1 = 170 country pairs to adjust for country-pair 
specific effects. By doing this, we allow each cross-country pair intercept to 
differ. In essence, we have N=170 parallel regression lines, and observations 
across time in each country vary around a base line level specific to that country 
(Studenmund, 2011).  
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While the fixed effects model takes account of time-invariant factors, observed or 
unobserved, it also has some drawbacks. Degrees of freedom tend to be relatively 
low due to the time-demeaning of the data (Studenmund, 2011), which generally 
reduces the efficiency of the parameter estimates. In addition, any substantive 
explanatory variables that do not vary across time in each unit will be perfectly 
collinear with the fixed effects, so we cannot include them in the model. The first 
drawback should not constitute a problem in our analysis due to the large amount 
of observations. The second drawback, however, implies that we cannot 
investigate time-invariant causes of the dependent variables. Fixed-effects models 
are designed to study the causes of changes within an entity, in this case bilateral 
entities. A time-invariant characteristic cannot cause such a change, because it is 
constant for each entity.  
 
Hypotheses H1 through H4 are tested in two equations in the FE model: 
 
(3) Yijt = β0 + β1Structural deficit divergenceijt + β2Cyclical deficit 
divergenceijt + β3Z + β4Aij + eijt 
(4) Yijt = β0 + β1Primary deficit divergenceijt + β2Interest divergenceijt + β3Z +   
β4Aij + eijt 
 
where Yijτ is the transformed correlation coefficient between country i and j in 
period t, Z is a vector of different control variables, Aij measures the country-pair-
fixed effects, and eijt is the error term. Note that in models (1) and (2), εijt = Aij + 
eijt, implying that the original error term in the simple OLS estimation is now 
divided into two components: the country-pair specific effects and a new error 
term.  
 
7. Results 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our data set.  
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Period N Minimum Maxium Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Correlation (CF) 1 36 -0,949 1,000 0,087 0,597 
  2 136 -0,770 0,969 0,438 0,427 
  3 171 0,301 0,983 0,748 0,168 
  All 343 -0,949 1,000 0,556 0,412 
Transformed correlation 
(CF) 1 35
25
 -1,822 3,800 0,113 1,019 
  2 136 -1,020 2,076 0,585 0,603 
  3 171 0,311 2,380 1,089 0,421 
  All 342 -1,822 3,800 0,786 0,667 
Structural deficit 
divergence 1 66 0,497 18,119 6,519 4,080 
  2 171 0,469 10,649 3,327 2,075 
  3 171 0,960 9,497 3,758 1,785 
  All 408 0,469 18,119 4,024 2,652 
Cyclical deficit 
divergence 1 66 0,022 2,267 0,866 0,520 
  2 171 0,126 2,063 0,757 0,444 
  3 171 0,287 1,628 0,793 0,272 
  All 408 0,022 2,267 0,790 0,397 
Primary deficit 
divergence 1 66 0,137 11,958 4,111 2,454 
  2 171 0,522 12,032 3,868 2,503 
  3 171 0,949 7,573 3,460 1,526 
  All 408 0,137 12,032 3,736 2,148 
Interest payments 
divergence 1 66 0,772 11,153 3,701 2,398 
  2 171 0,100 10,091 2,811 2,244 
  3 171 0,146 5,060 1,454 1,064 
  All 408 0,100 11,153 2,386 2,053 
Trade intensity 1 103 -0,066 0,421 0,264 0,106 
  2 171 -0,091 0,423 0,269 0,101 
  3 171 -0,019 0,425 0,287 0,089 
  All 445 -0,091 0,425 0,275 0,098 
Industrial similarity 1 105 9,625 42,981 23,514 6,905 
  2 136 6,665 48,769 23,794 9,319 
  3 136 7,765 56,538 26,180 11,105 
  All 377 6,665 56,538 24,577 9,493 
Capital controls 1 78 0,282 1,679 1,097 0,324 
  2 171 0,077 1,710 0,659 0,364 
  3 171 0,058 1,192 0,487 0,221 
  All 420 0,058 1,710 0,670 0,375 
 
                                                 
25
 One of the correlation coefficients in period 1 has the value 1, and this value cannot be 
converted by the Fisher’s transformation. Thus, the sample size of the transformed correlation 
coefficient in period 1 is 35.  
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Despite having a potential sample size of 513 observations, our real sample is 
smaller due to missing data in some of the variables, especially in the first period.  
 
The dependent variable, the transformed business cycle correlation coefficient, 
has a total mean of 0.79. The mean has increased constantly during the three 
observed periods, implying an increase in average bilateral business cycle 
correlation over time. However, the standard deviation is high (0.67 for all 
periods). This implies that within a ± one standard deviation, we find bilateral 
relationships with values as low as 0.12 and as high as 1.46.  
 
All the independent variables, measuring different levels of fiscal policy 
divergence, have relatively high standard deviations, implying dispersion in the 
observed values of divergence. The means have constantly decreased over the 
three periods (with the exception of cyclical component divergence and 
discretionary divergence between the second and the third period which show a 
small increase). This implies that the countries have become more similar in fiscal 
policies over time. Scatter plots of all the independent variables against the 
dependent variable over the three time periods and over the whole sample period 
as a whole are to be found in appendix 7. Overall, the scatter plots seem to support 
our hypotheses that the independent variables have a negative effect on the 
dependent variable.  
 
7.2 Data screening 
A problem of multicollinearity occurs when two or more explanatory variables in 
a multiple regression model are highly correlated. In this situation the coefficients 
estimates may change randomly in response to small changes in the data. We test 
for problems of multicollinearity by computing the correlation coefficients 
between the independent variables (table 4). None of the correlation coefficients 
exceed the value of 0.8, meaning that they should not create any problems 
(Studenmund, 2011). We also compute a ‘Variance Inflation Factors’ (VIF) test , 
which confirms no problems of multicollinearity in our data since none of the  
VIF value which exceeds the value 5 (Studenmund, 2011).  
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TABLE 4: CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  
Structural 
deficit 
divergence 
Cyclical 
deficit 
divergence 
Primary 
deficit 
divergence 
Interest 
payments 
divergence 
Structural deficit 
divergence 1 -0,053 0,527 0,377 
Cyclical deficit 
divergence 0,053 1 -0,3 -0,089 
Primary deficit 
divergence 0,527 -0,03 1 0,107 
Interest 
payments 
divergence 
0,377 -0,089 0,107 1 
 
The homoscedasticity assumption for multiple regression requires that the 
variance of the unobservable error is constant, V(εj) = σ2 for all j (Wooldridge, 
2009). Graphs of the residuals plots for all variables (appendix 8) show no sign of 
heteroscedasticity problems. We also compute the White test in order to test for 
generic heteroscedasticity. The test shows no sign of heteroscedasticity in the data 
set.  
 
The assumption of no serial correlation states that the observations of the error 
term should be uncorrelated. We compute the Durbin-Watson d Test to test for 
this assumption. There is no single rule for which values indicate evidence of 
serial correlation, but values below 1 and above 3 are signs of a serial correlation 
problem. A value of 2 shows no correlation between the residuals.26 Our test 
results may indicate the existence of autocorrelation, which is not surprising, as 
we deal with time series data. Nevertheless, it is important to note that residual 
autocorrelation is not so much a property of the data, as a symptom of an 
inadequate model (Cottrell & Lucchetti, 2011). Additionally, we would need 
longer time series in order to deal with this problem. Therefore, we choose not to 
do any transformation to resolve the autocorrelation problem. Instead, we include 
a lagged independent variable in one of our robustness checks. The existence of 
autocorrelation may constitute a weakness in our analysis. 
 
                                                 
26
 The results of Savin and White (1977) provide the critical values 1.651 (lower limits) and 1.817 
(upper limits) for 150 observations and 6 regressors including the intercept for the 5% significance 
level. The Durbin-Watson d test gives a value of 1.452 for equation 1, and a value of 1.408 for 
equation 2. Since our test values are lower than the lower critical value, we reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
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7.3 Multivariate analysis 
The hypotheses are tested in equations 1 and 2 in the OLS model, and in equations 
3 and 4 in the FE model (see chapter 6.5). The control variables have been entered 
stepwise as to investigate possible changes in the effect of each independent 
variable on the dependent variable and the model as a whole.  
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7.3.1 Pooled OLS estimation 
TABLE 5a: POOLED OLS ESTIMATION EQUATION 1 
Variables     
Intercept 1.207*** (0.092 0.959*** (0.160) 0.776** (0.279) 1.567*** (0.318) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.032** (0.015) -0.020 (0.016) -0.019 (0.019) -0.010 (0.018) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.325*** (0.091) -0.318** (0.093) -0.334** (0.105) -0.381*** (0.102) 
Trade intensity   0.715* (0.382) 1.208† (0.625) 0.189 (0.642) 
Industrial similarity     0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
Capital controls       -0.668*** (0.144) 
           
R
2
 0.055  0.062  0.069  0.137   
Adjusted R
2
 0.049  0.053  0.055  0.121   
F statistics 9.633***  7.155***  5.003***  8.617***   
Df (residual) 332  324  272  271   
N 335   328   277   277   
TABLE 5b: POOLED OLS ESTIMATION EQUATION 2 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.043*** (0.075) 0.744*** (0.144) 0.554* (0.279) 1.110*** (0.306) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.034* (0.017) -0.025 (0.018) -0.016 (0.020) 0.005 (0.020) 
Interest payments divergence -0.044** (0.019) -0.043* (0.020) -0.047* (0.021) -0.039† (0.021) 
Trade intensity 
  
0.924* (0.386) 1.469* (0.642) 0.740 (0.062) 
Industrial similarity 
    
0.000 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) 
Capital controls 
      
-0.601*** (0.152) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.033 
 
0.044 
 
0.051 
 
0.103   
Adjusted R
2
 0.027 
 
0.035 
 
0.037 
 
0.086   
F statistics 5.579** 
 
4.962** 
 
3.646** 
 
6.215***   
Df (residual) 332 
 
324 
 
272 
 
271   
N 335  328  277  277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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The pooled OLS estimation is used as a benchmark to which the fixed effects 
analysis is compared. Table 5a presents the results from the pooled OLS 
estimation for equation 1. The results show that structural deficit divergence is 
significantly and negatively correlated with business cycle synchronization only 
when no control variable is included. Cyclical deficit divergence is significantly 
and negatively correlated with business cycle synchronization in all equations. 
The coefficient of trade intensity is positive in all equations, as is in line with our 
expectations, however, only significant at a 5% significance level when no more 
control variable is included. The coefficient of industrial similarity changes 
between being positive and negative. The variable capital controls is significantly 
and negatively correlated with business cycle correlation. 
 
Table 5b presents the results from the pooled OLS estimation for equation 2. 
Primary deficit divergence is significant and negative only when no control 
variable is included. Interest divergence is significantly and negatively correlated 
with business cycle synchronization, however, only at a significance level of 10% 
when all control variables are included. The coefficient of trade intensity is 
positive as is in line with our expectations, however, not significant when all 
control variables are included. Industrial similarity is not significantly correlated 
to the dependent variable, while the variable capital controls is significantly and 
negatively correlated to the dependent variable. 
 
R2 has a value of 5.5% in equation 1a, while adjusted R2 is 4.9%, and these values 
increase when the control variables are added. For equation 2a the values are 3.3% 
and 2.7%, respectively. The low explanatory power of the models is not surprising 
as it most likely exist relevant variables that are not accounted for in the models. 
The FE regressions in tables 6a and 6b suggest that a large fraction on the 
unexplained variation is country-pair fixed.  
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7.3.2 Fixed effects estimation 
TABLE 6a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.1750*** (0.183) -6.019*** (0.871) -7.994*** (1.028) -4.358*** (1.281) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.0416 (0.0273) -0.007 (0.027) 0.008 (0.027) 0.052† (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.243 (0.160) -0.344* (0.139) -0.367* (0.143) -0.422** (0.135) 
Trade intensity 
  
24.487*** (2.965) 29.178*** (3.326) 17.785*** (4.088) 
Industrial similarity  
    
-0.002 (0.014) 0.014 (0.014) 
Capital controls  
      
-1.111*** (0.257) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.414 
 
0.601 
 
0.631 
 
0.676   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.208 
 
0.152 
 
0.257 
 
0.342   
F statistics 0.666 
 
1.339* 
 
1.685** 
 
2.024***   
N 335  328  277  277   
TABLE 6b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.131*** (0.122) -5.060*** (1.049) -6.781*** (1.260) -4.778*** (1.388) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.035 (0.030) 0.016 (0.020) 0.024 (0.0297559) 0.050† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence -0.176*** (0.035) -0.079* (0.037) -0.081* (0.039) -0.046 (0.039) 
Trade intensity 
  
20.655*** (3.392) 25.721*** (3.805) 19.076*** (4.287) 
Industrial similarity 
    
-0.015 (0.0141865) -0.001 (0.014) 
Capital controls 
      
-0.816** (0.267) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.492 
 
0.595 
 
0.624 
 
0.648   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.048 
 
0.141 
 
0.243 
 
0.286   
F statistics 0.911 
 
1.310* 
 
1.638** 
 
1.791***   
N 335  328  277  277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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The results from the fixed effects estimation are mostly in line with the results 
from the OLS estimation. However, the explanatory power of the models is now 
much higher. R2 is 41.4% when no control variable is included in equation 3, 
while adjusted R2 is -20.8%. For equation 4 the values are 49.2% and -4.8%, 
respectively. A negative adjusted R2 indicates a poor model fit relative to the 
number of degrees of freedom (Wooldridge, 2009). Adjusted R2 increases when 
the control variables are added to the model, which indicates better model fit.   
 
Table 6a presents the results from the fixed effects estimation for equation 3. The 
results show that the coefficient of structural deficit divergence changes between 
being positive and negative. The coefficient of cyclical deficit divergence is 
significant and negative for all equation, except when no control variable is 
included, as in line with our expectations. Trade intensity is, as expected, 
significantly and positively related to business cycle synchronization, industrial 
similarity is not significant in any equations, while the variable capital controls is 
significantly and negatively correlated with the dependent variable.  
 
Table 6b presents the results from the fixed effects estimation for equation 4. The 
coefficient of primary deficit divergence alters between being positive and 
negative, and is never significant. Interest payments divergence is significantly 
and negatively correlated with business cycle synchronization except when all 
control variables are included. Trade intensity is significantly and positively 
related to business cycle synchronization, industrial similarity is not significant, 
while the variable capital controls is significantly and negatively correlated with 
the dependent variable.  
 
7.3.3 Robustness checks 
We explore the robustness of our findings to: a) differences in the entry order of 
control variables; b) sample selection; c) inclusion of other controls; and d) a 
different measure of the dependent variable. The performed robustness-check 
analyses are all fixed effects estimations.  
 
Differences in the entry order of control variables 
Changes in the entry order of the control variables do not change the general 
pattern in our finding. We have tried to include control variables in all possible 
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orders. Consequently, we have performed five additional analyses. The results 
from these can be found in tables 8-12 in appendix 9. The general pattern of the 
results is the same irrespective of the entry order of the control variables. 
 
Sample selection 
There are missing observations in the sample, and especially the first period is 
missing quite a lot of observations which may constitute a concern. To check the 
robustness of the variables we conduct a fixed effect analyses in which 
observations from the first period are deleted. The results can be found in table 13 
in appendix 10, and do not differ considerably from the analysis based on all three 
periods. 
 
Some of the observations are calculated based on means of yearly data. Several of 
these means are calculated without a fully complete data set. To check whether 
this may have caused bias in our estimations we perform a fixed effect analysis in 
which we delete observations based on means of data from fewer than three years. 
The results are to be found in table 14 in appendix 10, and the main results do not 
differ considerably from the analysis based on all available observations.  
 
We exclude the three countries not sharing the euro as a common currency, 
namely Denmark, Sweden, and the UK. Doing this changes the results on the 
affect of cyclical deficit divergence on the dependent variable. Cyclical deficit 
divergence is now only negative and significant at a 10% level when all control 
variables are included in the analysis. It is difficult to interpret why this happens. 
However, the integration process is not uniform across Europe. European 
countries have joined the EU and the EMU at different points in time, and this 
seems to influence our results. Nevertheless, as the three non-euro countries are 
under the obligation of complying with regulations in the SGP, we choose to 
include these countries in our analysis. The results of the regressions excluding 
Denmark, Sweden, and the UK from the sample is to be found in table 15 in 
appendix 10. 
 
Inclusion of other controls 
In order to reduce possible bias caused by the fact that one or more independent 
variables may be correlated with an omitted variable that we have not accounted 
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for in the analysis, we include the value of the dependent variable from an earlier 
period as a control (Yt-1). Using lagged dependent variables as proxy variables 
provides a simple way to account for historical factors that cause current 
differences in the dependent variable that are difficult to account for in other ways 
(Wooldridge, 2009). The lagged Y variable switches between having a positive 
and a negative value, and is overall not significance. This indicates that this 
variable might not belong in the model. The results of the regressions with the 
lagged Y variable are to be found in table 16 in appendix 11. 
 
We also conduct a fixed effect analysis in which we include time dummies with 
period 1 as the reference period. The results show that the dummy variable for 
period 2 is significantly and positively related to business cycle synchronization 
when none or one control variable is included in equations 3 and 4. The dummy 
variable for period 3 is significantly and positively related to business cycle 
synchronization except when all control variables are included in equation 3. In 
addition, including the time dummies make most of the effects of the independent 
variables and the control variables disappear. This indicates that there exists an 
average change over time for all country pairs in which the country pairs become 
more similar when it comes to all our variables. The effects we have found may 
be claimed to be driven by common trends. The results of the fixed effect analysis 
with time dummies are to be found in table 17 in appendix 11. 
 
Different measure of dependent variable 
We conduct a fixed effects analysis in which we make use of the transformed 
business cycle correlation coefficient composed by the HP filter instead of the CF 
filter. The results are to be found in table 18 in appendix 12. The analysis yields 
basically the same results with respect to the sign of the coefficients, but now 
almost all coefficients become significant. Nevertheless, as we know the HP filter 
tends to give imprecise estimates of the trend at end-point series, and that we yet 
have used all estimated cyclical components in our analysis, we choose not to 
base our interpretation on the results obtained with the HP filter. 
 
7.3.4 Summary of results 
Hypothesis 1 stated that divergence of the structural deficit between two EMU 
countries has a negative effect on the synchronization of these countries’ business 
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cycles. The variable structural deficit divergence is most often not significantly 
correlated with business cycle synchronization. In addition, the sign of its 
coefficient changes between being positive and negative. Hence, we find no 
support for hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2 stated that divergence of the cyclical deficit between two EMU 
countries has a negative effect on the synchronization of these countries’ business 
cycles. The variable cyclical deficit divergence is significantly and negatively 
correlated with business cycle synchronization in most of our regressions. Thus, 
we claim to have found support for hypothesis 2.  
 
Hypothesis 3 stated that divergence of the primary deficit between two EMU 
countries has a negative effect on the synchronization of these countries’ business 
cycles. The variable primary deficit divergence is most often not significantly 
correlated with business cycle synchronization, and the sign of its coefficient 
changes between being positive and negative. Hence, we find no support for 
hypothesis 3.  
 
Hypothesis 4 stated that divergence of interest payments between two EMU 
countries has a negative effect on the synchronization of these countries’ business 
cycles. The variable interest payments divergence is significantly and negatively 
correlated with business cycle synchronization in most of our regression. Thus, 
we claim to have found support for hypothesis 4.  
 
8. Discussion 
In this study we have found that divergence of cyclical deficit between two 
countries decreases business cycle synchronization. Further, we have found that 
divergence of interest payments decreases the synchronization of bilateral 
business cycles. In other words, convergence of cyclical deficit and convergence 
of interest payments between two EMU countries increase business cycle 
synchronization. Surprisingly, neither convergence of structural deficit nor 
convergence of primary deficit is found to significantly explain business cycle 
synchronization. The latter findings contradict with a range of previous studies 
investigating the impact of fiscal policy convergence on business cycle 
synchronization.  
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8.1 Discussion of findings 
The OCA theory states that collective monetary policy is most appropriate if 
business cycles are synchronised (chapter 2.2). As stated in our descriptive results, 
our analyses show an increase in bilateral business cycle correlation over time. 
These results support De Grauwe and Mongelli‘s (2005) argument on the 
endogenous effect of monetary integration on the synchronization of business 
cycles, namely that sharing a single currency set in motion forces bringing 
countries’ economies closer together, as explained in chapter 4.3. Implicitly the 
OCA theory states that the business cycles should be synchronized ex ante in 
order for the currency union to be optimum. However, the OCA theory does not 
take into account endogenous forces that may increase the synchronization of 
business cycles ex post. Our findings support the existence of such forces. 
 
Our results show that convergence of structural deficit does not significantly 
explain business cycle synchronization. Thus our findings imply that convergence 
of fiscal stances of the policymakers is not significant for bilateral business cycle 
correlation.  Darvas, Rose and Szapáry’s (2007) conclusion that convergence of 
structural deficit increases business cycle synchronization differs from our results. 
However, they examine the general government deficit as the structural deficit, 
while we examine the cyclically adjusted budget balance. On the other hand, 
Artis, Fidrmuc and Scharler (2008) find that convergence of the cyclically 
adjusted budget balance decreases business cycle synchronization, and thus their 
results differ from our results.   
 
Our results support that convergence of cyclical deficit increases bilateral business 
cycle synchronization. In other words, countries with more similar cyclical 
components share more similar business cycles. In our data, the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers consist of personal tax income, social security contributions, corporate 
income tax, indirect taxes of national revenue, and unemployment related 
transfers (appendix 5). As explained in chapter 6.3.3, these components are due to 
variations in business cycle fluctuations in unemployment and tax bases. Van den 
Noord (2000) finds that automatic fiscal stabilizers smooth the cyclical volatility 
for individual nations in OECD, and  Dullien (2007) finds the existence of 
sizeable automatic stabilizers in the EMU (chapter 4.2.2). Our results are 
interesting in relation to the studies of these authors as we find that automatic 
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fiscal stabilizers are also important to create more similar business cycles 
bilaterally in our sample.  
 
Surprisingly, our results show that convergence of primary deficit is found not to 
significantly explain business cycle synchronization. Darvas, Rose and Szapáry 
(2007) use the primary deficit to be a measure that captures discretionary fiscal 
policy. They examine if convergence of the primary deficit increases business 
cycle synchronization, and their results are in contrast to our findings. Darvas, 
Rose and Szapáry (2007) find that bilateral convergence of the primary deficit has 
increased business cycle synchronization (chapter 4.2.4).  
 
Our findings support that convergence of interest payments increases the 
synchronization of bilateral business cycles. This means that similar interest 
payments will increase business cycle synchronization. This is interesting as 
interest payments are considered to be a part of discretionary policy, which we 
find not to be significantly related to business cycle synchronization. However, 
according to Hattenhouer (2000) in Gianviti et al. (2010), the main asset of a 
sovereign debtor is its power and capacity to tax.  This is interesting as we find 
convergence of taxes in the form of automatic fiscal stabilizers to be significant. 
 
The control variables trade intensity and capital controls are found to be 
significantly related to business cycle synchronization, and industrial similarity is 
found not to be significant. Our findings on trade intensity are in line with Frankel 
and Rose (1998) who find that closer international trade links result in more 
correlated business cycles across nations (chapter 4.3.1). Our findings on trade 
intensity are also supported by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) who find that 
bilateral trade has an independent role in transmitting business cycles, and Imbs 
(2004) who verifies the overall positive impact of trade on business cycle 
synchronization (chapter 4.3.1). Our results support the argument that intra-
industry trade accounts for most trade, and thus that more bilateral trade increases 
the bilateral synchronization of business cycles.  
 
Our findings on industrial similarity are coherent with Baxter and Kouparitsas’ 
(2005) findings that industrial structure is not a robust determinant of business 
cycle synchronization. This is not coherent with the findings of Imbs (2004), 
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neither the findings of Calderón, Chong and Stein (2007), nor the ones of Haan, 
Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008), who find that industrial similarity affects business 
cycle correlation. Our results do not support the view that two economies 
producing the same types of goods or services will be subjected to similar 
economic developments.  
 
Our findings that financial integration increases business cycle synchronization, 
support the conclusion of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001), Kose, 
Otrok and Whiteman (2003), and Imbs (2004). It is interesting to note that we 
obtain the same results as previous studies when we only use capital control to 
obtain a measure of financial integration. Our results support the argument that 
financial linkages could result in a higher degree of business cycle 
synchronization due to demand side effects or contagion effects. However, we 
cannot conclude on which of these effects that are driving the increased 
synchronization of business cycles.  
 
It is important to note that when time dummies are included in our analysis, most 
of the effects of the independent variables and the control variables on business 
cycle synchronization disappear. This indicates the existence of an average change 
over time, in which the country pairs become more similar when it comes to all 
our variables. This is supported by looking at the descriptive statistics. The 
countries have become more similar in fiscal policies over time, and the value of 
the dependent variable has increased constantly during the three periods observed. 
This means that the effects we have found may be driven by common trends. 
Therefore, we should be careful with putting forward strongly held views on the 
importance of our conclusions. There might be a need for an analysis including 
data from more years in the future.  
 
8.2 Implications for EMU policy 
Our results hold implications for fiscal policy guidelines for EMU countries. 
Further fiscal reforms should try to better align the countries’ fiscal positions in 
order to create a more uniform business cycle across the union, and by this 
provide for EMU to be an optimum currency area. 
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Mundell (1961, p. 661) predicted the need for “a profound political change” to 
make countries give up their national currencies for a regional currency and a 
common monetary policy. According to our results, there is a need for a more 
profound political change that includes aligning the EMU members’ automatic 
fiscal stabilizers. As automatic fiscal stabilizers are income taxes and 
unemployment insurances the cyclical components are an expression of the 
welfare system. Today, the welfare system is governed at a national level, and is 
such a symbol of national sovereignty.  Matthew Lynn (2011) points out that the 
economies that have joined the EMU have vastly different characteristics when it 
comes to welfare systems. In his view, this makes EMU economically 
unsustainable. Linking this to our results, the profound political change should 
include automatic stabilizers. This calls for a deeper fiscal union within the 
monetary union. It is not a purpose of this thesis to recommend the design of such 
a fiscal union, but our study on automatic fiscal stabilizers suggests that EU policy 
makers should pay special attention to the tax systems and the unemployment 
schemes of the member states.  
 
The EMU has in recent years increased its focus on debt. This is not surprising as 
sovereign debt trends suggest that the debt-to-GDP ratio has been increasing at a 
non-sustainable level for several member states. According to our findings, 
accrual of debt should be of concern to business cycle synchronization. Dullien 
(2007) stresses that several member states accrued debt in order to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Hence, debt became a stabilization cost for the monetary 
union. Our finding that convergence of interest payments tends to increase 
business cycle synchronization across EMU member states is interesting taking 
into account that convergence of cyclical deficit is also found to significantly 
increase business cycle synchronization. This links the two convergence criteria 
of Maastricht. Further on, cyclical deficit and interest payments can be argued to 
be extensions of the tax variables and debt variables in the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem, and the extensions stress the relevance of taxes and debt for bilateral 
business cycle synchronization. Hattenhouer (2000) in Gianviti et al. (2010) also 
links the two variables, stating that sovereign debtor’s most important asset is its 
power and the capability to tax. Linking our finding to Gali and Perotti’s (2003) 
argument, that interest payments are a result of earlier fiscal stances, the SGP 
should have an increased focus on the debt criterion. The EU has already 
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augmented its focus on this criterion by a new focus on member states’ ability to 
pay the interest rates. This is evident in the reformed SGP in which a benchmark 
for sufficiently diminishing debt ratio is included. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Our research question asks if fiscal policy convergence between two EMU 
countries affect the synchronization of these countries’ business cycles. Through 
our distinction of fiscal policy measures, we have found that bilateral convergence 
of automatic fiscal stabilizers and bilateral convergence of accumulated 
government debt increase business cycle synchronization in the EMU. The 
Maastricht fiscal criteria and the SGP have no direct relation to the OCA criteria 
of synchronized business cycles as the aim of the SGP is to provide a fiscal 
framework for nations to uphold domestic price stability in order to meet the 
monetary policy set by ECB. Our results suggest that if the Maastricht criteria and 
the SGP induce fiscal policy convergence with respect to automatic fiscal 
stabilizers and accumulated government debt, they indirectly enhance the stability 
and sustainability of EMU by increasing business cycle synchronization. The 
pattern in our data suggest that if EU policy makers allow fiscal policy to work as 
endogenous forces towards making the EMU an optimum currency area, fiscal 
policy may be better off coordinated at a supranational level and not decided upon 
at the domestic level, as postulated in Mundell’s assignment rule.  Moreover, at a 
supranational level, another available interpretation of our results suggest that the 
OCA theory is too static as it does not take into account endogenous forces that 
might change the economic situation in individual EMU member states ex post the 
introduction of a common currency. More generally, our results relate to the 
Lucas critique. In particular our results suggest that policy changes related to the 
automatic fiscal stabilizers and debt dynamics of countries lead to changes in 
macroeconomic parameters. 
 
10. Final comments 
This study is a quantitative study, and the findings should in principle be 
transferable to other monetary unions. However, there only exist two monetary 
unions in the world today, namely the euro in Economic and Monetary Union of 
the European Union and the dollar in the federal United States of America. The 
EMU is special because it exists of sovereign national states, while the USA is 
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one federation. This, in addition to the fact that our sample only consists of 
European countries, may make the transferability of our results limited.  
 
While working with our thesis, we have become aware of themes connected to 
this thesis that constitute interesting areas of research in the future. We have 
excluded potential new EMU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. It 
would be interesting to verify whether the alleged endogenous effects work ex 
ante to create a more uniform European business cycle when these countries 
become members of the EMU and more data is available. It would also be 
interesting to include non-European countries in the sample to investigate if our 
results are exclusively characteristic for Europe. Finally, it is worth noticing that 
the EMU is still a young monetary union, formed only a decade ago, and it would 
be interesting to redo the analysis in the future when more data will be available.  
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Appendix 1: Distribution of articles from the qualitative study 
 
TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES REVISED IN QUALITATIVE PREPARATORY STUDY 
Journal/year: 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
European 
Union Politics 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 4 1 2 - 3 - - - 2 
International 
Organization 
- 2 1 1 - 1 - 1 5 - 2 - 9 1 1 - 1 - - - -  
Journal of 
European 
Policy 
- - - - - - - - - 2 2 - 2 4 11 1 1 - 1 9  - 
Journal of 
Common 
Market Studies 
 2  4  1  3  2  4  3 3  1 7 13 9 7 17 20 15 18 7 4 19  - 
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Appendix 2: Graphs business cycles: the HP versus the CF filter 
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Appendix 3: Frequency distribution dependent variable 
Correlation coefficient: 
 
Transformed correlation coefficient: 
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Appendix 4: Measuring potential growth and output gaps - a 
production function approach 
As we want to separate the cyclical component from the discretionary component 
of debt and deficit, we need a method that allows for cyclical developments. Any 
meaningful analysis of cyclical developments, of medium term growth prospects 
or of the stance of fiscal and monetary policies is predicated on either an implicit 
or explicit assumption concerning the rate of potential output growth (European 
Commission, 2006). The concept can only be derived from either a purely 
statistical approach, for example filtering methods as we do when measuring 
business cycles, or from a full econometric analysis. As mentioned above, we use 
data from the AMECO database applying an econometric approach when 
measuring fiscal policies. This approach constitutes the reference method when 
assessing the stability and convergence programmes, namely the production 
function approach (PF) for the estimation of output gaps presented by ECOFIN. 
Instead of making statistical assumptions on the time series properties of trends 
and their correlation with the cycle, the production function approach makes 
assumptions based on economic theory and focuses on the supply potential of an 
economy. This approach is preferred to a statistical approach inter alia because 
one gains the possibility of examining the underlying economic factors which are 
driving any observed changes in the potential output indicator and consequently 
the opportunity of establishing a meaningful link between policy reform measures 
with actual outcomes (European Commission, 2006). However, a drawback 
emerges as regards achieving a consensus amongst policy makers on the modeling 
and estimation methods to be employed because the PF approach requires 
assumptions on the functional form of the production technology, returns to scale, 
trend technical progress (TFP) and the representative utilization of production 
factors (European Commission, 2006).  
 
The ECOFIN’s PF approach is developed as an operational surveillance tool in 
the assessment of the annual stability / convergence programmes of the EU’s 
member states, and is based on three requirements: (1) simplicity and 
transparency, (2) equal treatment for all member states, and (3) a prudent view 
regarding the assessment of the past and future evolution of potential growth in 
the EU. The PF approach estimates potential GDP (Y) by a combination of factor 
inputs, labour (L) and the capital stock (K), corrected for the degree of capacity 
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utilization (UL, UK), adjusted for the level of efficiency (EL, EK) (European 
Commission, 2010). A Cobb-Douglas specification assuming constant returns to 
scale is chosen for the functional form: 
Y = (ULLEL)α (UKKEK)1-α = LαK1-α * TFP 
TFP = (ELαEK1-α) (ULαUK1-α) 
The same specification is assumed for all countries, and the mean wage share for 
the EU15 over the period 1960-2000 is used as the estimate for the output 
elasticity of labor. This gives of 0.63 for α for all member states, and thus a value 
of 0.37 for 1-α.  
 
Trend TFP and potential factor use must be determined when moving from actual 
to potential output. A HP filter is used to extract trend for TFP, and the level of 
employment consistent with non-accelerating wage inflation (NAWRU) is 
applied to extract the potential output contribution of employment. No distinction 
is made between actual and potential capital (European Commission, 2010). For a 
detailed presentation of the model, see “Calculating potential growth rates and 
output gaps - A revised production function approach” (European Commission, 
2006). 
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Appendix 5: Guidelines for measurement of SGP criteria 
The multilateral fiscal surveillance of the SGP is based on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) which sets out schedules and deadlines for the Council, 
following reports from and on the basis of opinions by the Commission and the 
Economic and Financial Committee, on how to judge whether an excessive deficit 
exists in a Member State. The reference values for deficit and debt under the EDP 
are based on concepts defined in European System of Accounts (ESA95). ESA95 
is derived from, and almost entirely consistent with, the worldwide manual for 
national accounts (SNA93) (European Commission, 2010). 
 
The government deficit is defined as “the balancing item “net borrowing/net 
lending” of General Government, including streams of interest payments resulting 
from swaps arrangements and forward rate agreements” (European Commission, 
2010). Government is defined as the sector of general government which includes 
central government, state government, local government and social security funds. 
The budget balance consists of national revenue and expenditure. The cyclical 
components of national revenue are defined as personal tax income, social 
security contributions, corporate income tax and indirect taxes. The cyclical 
component of national expenditure is defined as unemployment related transfers. 
The different components are weighted by the relative share of each category in 
total revenue. These budgetary tax and transfer elasticities are calculated by 
OECD (European Commission, 2010). 
 
Eurostat has special guidelines considering debt under the EDP. Government debt 
under the EDP remains similar in the ESA95 definition of government sector and 
of liabilities, but differs from it because debt is measured at nominal value (and 
not market value as in national accounts). The government debt is defined as the 
total consolidated gross debt at nominal value in the following categories of 
government liabilities: currency and deposits, securities other than shares 
excluding financial derivatives, loans and other accounts payable, and in some 
cases of specific units classified in the government sector, shares and other equity, 
and insurance technical reserves (European Commission, 2010). In EMU 
recording accrued interest is important for general government regarding the 
amount of debt in the member states, and regarding the specific debt instruments 
that are frequently used for deficit financing. The aim of implementing interest 
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payments in ESA 95 was to measure the rights and commitments between 
economic agents, expressed through financial assets and liabilities, at any point in 
time (European Commission, 2010). Accrued interests are recorded when 
economic value is created, transformed and extinguished, or when claims and 
obligations arise, are transformed or are cancelled. Thus, output is recorded when 
produced, not when paid for by purchaser, and the sale of an asset is recorded 
when the asset changes hands, not when the corresponding payment is made In 
the EDP compilations, interest payments from swap agreements and forward rate 
agreements have to be included. The net flows thus affect the government deficit 
(European Commission, 2010).  
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Appendix 6: Miniane’s framework for measuring capital controls 
The subsequent description of the methodology of calculating capital controls 
indices are described in Miniane (2004). The AREAER was reorganized in 1996. 
The choice of the capital controls in this thesis is, in line with Miniane, influenced 
by the 1996 edition. The 1996 edition divides capital controls in 13 sub-
categories. We use these 13 capital controls in our thesis, also a fourteenth derived 
by Miniane. This means that in our extended dataset we derive the controls pre-
1996 from text on capital in AREAER, and that we remain true to the 14 controls 
pre-1996 even though new controls have been added. The capital controls 
included in our analysis are:  
• Capital market securities,  
• Money market instruments,  
• Collective investment securities,  
• Derivatives and other instruments,  
• Commercial credits,  
• Financial credits,  
• Guarantees, sureties and financial back-up facilities, 
• Direct investment, 
• Repatriation  of profits or liquidation of direct investment, 
• Real estate transactions, 
• Personal capital movements, 
• Provision specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions,  
• Provisions specific to institutional investors, 
• Multiple exchange rate mechanism 
Miniane has mentioned elements in the construction of the indices. These 
elements will be included here. The post-1996 editions of AREAER provide 
clearly distinguished controls on outflows and inflows, whereas the text 
information in pre-1996 editions does not always contain information on both 
flows. Therefore, the indices account for both flows, like in Miniane (2004). 
Another element is that some countries have restrictions on foreign equity 
participation in some sectors. The new AREAER computes this in both capital 
market securities and in foreign direct investment. Miniane considers this to be 
double counting, and computes the measure as a single restriction on foreign 
direct investments. A third element is that many countries have restrictions on 
foreign investment in sectors related to defense and public order. Contrary to the 
AREAER, Miniane considers these not to be capital controls. The fourth element 
is that Miniane does not consider whether the controls are enforced, they are 
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valued if they exist. If AREAER clearly states that a control has never been 
enforced, the control is not given a value.   
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Appendix 7: X-Y Scatterplots27 
Period 1 (1980-1990): 
 
 
                                                 
27
 A blue line and the OLS equation appear only when the OLS coefficient is significant at a 5% 
level. 
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Period 2 (1991-1999): 
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Period 3 (2000-2010): 
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All periods: 
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Appendix 8: Residual plots 
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Appendix 9: Robustness check – differences in the entry order of control variables 
TABLE 8a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: TRADE INTENSITY, CAPITAL CONTROLS, INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY) 
Variables 
Intercept 1.175*** (0.183) -6.019*** (0.871) -3.060** (1.128) -4.358*** (1.281) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.042 (0.027) -0.007 (0.027) 0.041 (0.027) 0.052† (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.243 (0.160) -0.344* (0.139) -0.354** (0.133) -0.422** (0.135) 
Trade intensity 24.487*** (2.965) 15.691 *** (3.626) 17.785*** (4.088) 
Capital controls -0.903*** (0.232) -1.111*** (0.257) 
Industrial similarity 0.014 (0.014) 
    
R
2
 0.414 0.601 0.637 0.676   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.208 0.152 0.224 0.342   
F statistics 0.665855 1.339* 1.541** 2.024***   
  
N 335   328   328   277   
TABLE 8b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: TRADE INTENSITY, CAPITAL CONTROLS, INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY) 
Variables 
Intercept 1.131*** (0.122) -5.060*** (1.049) -3.129* (1.199) -4.778*** (1.388) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.035 (0.030) 0.016 (0.030) 0.043 (0.030) 0.050† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence -0.174*** (0.035) -0.079* (0.037) -0.052 (0.037) -0.046 (0.039) 
Trade intensity 20.655*** (3.392) 14.961*** (3.785) 19.076*** (4.287) 
Capital controls -0.741** (0.241) -0.816** (0.267) 
Industrial similarity -0.001 (0.014) 
    
R
2
 0.492 0.595 0.619 0.648   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.048 0.141 0.186 0.286   
F statistics 0.911 1.310* 1.428* 1.791   
  
N 335   328   328   277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 9a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY, CAPITAL CONTROLS, TRADE 
INTENSITY) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.175*** (0.183) 0.705† (0.409) 1,041** (0.326) -4.358*** (1.281) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.042 (0.027) -0.049† (0.028) 0.064* (0.025) 0.052† (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.243 (0.160) -0.305† (0.172) -0.437** (0.137) -0.422** (0.135) 
Industrial similarity 
  
0.023 (0.017) 0.037** (0.013) 0.014 (0.014) 
Capital controls 
    
-1.847*** (0.198) -1.111*** (0.257) 
Trade intensity 
      
17.785*** (4.088) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.414 
 
0.413 
 
0.634 
 
0.676   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.208 
 
-0.146 
 
0.281 
 
0.342   
F statistics 0.666 
 
0.739 
 
1.795*** 
 
2.024***   
  
       
  
N 335  284  284  277   
TABLE 9b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY, CAPITAL CONTROLS, TRADE 
INTENSITY) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.131*** (0.122) 1.441*** (0.410) 1.108** (0.371 ) -4.778*** (1.388) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.035 (0.030) -0.037 (0.031) 0.036 (0,031) 0.050† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence -0.174*** (0.035) -0.188*** (0.038) -0.065 (0,040) -0.046 (0.039) 
Industrial similarity 
  
-0.002 (0.015) 0.020 (0.014) -0.001 (0.014) 
Capital controls 
    
-1.399*** (0.230) -0.816** (0.267) 
Trade intensity 
      
19.076*** (4.287) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.492 
 
0.493  
 
0.597 
 
0.648   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.048 
 
0.011 
 
0.207 
 
0.286   
F statistics 0.911 
 
1.022 
 
1.533** 
 
1.791   
  
       
  
N 335  284  284  277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 10a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY,  TRADE INTENSITY, CAPITAL 
CONTROLS) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.175*** (0.183) 0.705† (0.409) -7.994*** (1.028) -4.358*** (1.281) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.042 (0.027) -0.049† (0.028) 0.008 (0.027) 0.052† (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.243 (0.160) -0.305† (0.172) -0.367* (0.143) -0.422** (0.135) 
Industrial similarity 
  
0.023 (0.017) -0.002 (0.014) 0.014 (0.014) 
Trade intensity 
    
29.178*** (3.326) 17.785*** (4.088) 
Capital controls 
      
-1.111*** (0.257) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.414 
 
0.413 
 
0.631 
 
0.676   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.208 
 
-0.146 
 
0.257 
 
0.342   
F statistics 0.666 
 
0.739 
 
1.685** 
 
2.024***   
  
       
  
N 335  284  277  277   
TABLE 10b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY,  TRADE INTENSITY, CAPITAL 
CONTROLS) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.131*** (0.122) 1.441*** (0.410) -6.781*** (1.260) -4.778*** (1.388) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.035 (0.030) -0.037 (0.031) 0.024 (0.030) 0.050† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence -0.174*** (0.035) -0.188*** (0.038) -0.081* (0.039) -0.046 (0.039) 
Industrial similarity 
  
-0.002 (0.015) -0.015 (0.014) -0.001 (0.014) 
Trade intensity 
    
25.721*** (3.805) 19.076*** (4.287) 
Capital controls 
      
-0.816** (0.267) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.492 
 
0.493  
 
0.624 
 
0.648   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.048 
 
0.011 
 
0.243 
 
0.286   
F statistics 0.911 
 
1.022 
 
1.638** 
 
1.791***   
Df (residual) 
       
  
N 335  284  277  277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 11a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: CAPITAL CONTROLS, INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY, TRADE 
INTENSITY) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.175*** (0.183) 1.805** (0.170) 1.041** (0.326) -4.358*** (1.281) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.042 (0.027) 0.049† (0.025) 0.064* (0.025) 0.052† (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.243 (0.160) -0.319* (0.134) -0.437** (0.137) -0.422** (0.135) 
Capital controls 
  
-1.541*** (0.183) -1.847*** (0.198) -1.111*** (0.257) 
Industrial similarity 
    
0.037** (0.013) 0.014 (0.014) 
Trade intensity 
      
17.785*** (4.088) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.414 
 
0.594 
 
0.634 
 
0.676   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.208 
 
0.157 
 
0.281 
 
0.342   
F statistics 0.666 
 
1.360* 
 
1.795*** 
 
2.024***   
  
       
  
N 335  335  284  277   
TABLE 11b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: CAPITAL CONTROLS, INDUSTRIAL SIMILARITY, TRADE 
INTENSITY) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.131*** (0.122) 1.577*** (0.120) 1.108** (0.371 ) -4.778*** (1.388) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.035 (0.030) 0.031 (0.030) 0.036 (0.031) 0.050† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence -0.174*** (0.035) -0.078* (0.036) -0,065 (0.040) -0.046 (0.039) 
Capital controls 
  
-1.194*** (0.206) -1.399*** (0.230) -0.816** (0.267) 
Industrial similarity 
    
0.020 (0.014) -0.001 (0.014) 
Trade intensity 
      
19.076*** (4.287) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.492 
 
0.579 
 
0.597 
 
0.648   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.048 
 
0.128 
 
0.207 
 
0.286   
F statistics 0.911 
 
1.282† 
 
1.533** 
 
1.791***   
  
       
  
N 335  335  284  277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 12a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: CAPITAL CONTROLS, TRADE INTENSITY, INDUSTRIAL 
SIMILARITY) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.175*** (0.183) 1.805** (0.170) -3.060** (1.128) -4.358*** (1.281) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.041 (0.027) 0.049† (0.025) 0.041 (0.027) 0.052† (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.243 (0.160) -0.319* (0.134) -0.354** (0.133) -0.422** (0.135) 
Capital controls 
  
-1.541*** (0.183) -0.903*** (0.232) -1.111*** (0.257) 
Trade intensity 
    
15.691 *** (3.626) 17.785*** (4.088) 
Industrial similarity 
      
0.014 (0.014) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.414 
 
0.594 
 
0.637 
 
0.676   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.208 
 
0.157 
 
0.224 
 
0.342   
F statistics 0.666 
 
1.360* 
 
1.541** 
 
2.024***   
  
       
  
N 335  335  328  277   
TABLE 12b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 (ENTRY ORDER CONTROL VARIABLES: CAPITAL CONTROLS, TRADE INTENSITY, INDUSTRIAL 
SIMILARITY) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.131*** (0.122) 1.577*** (0.120) -3.129* (1.198) -4.778*** (1.388) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.035 (0.030) 0.031 (0.030) 0.043  (0.030) 0.050† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence -0.174*** (0.035) -0.078* (0.036) -0.052 (0.037) -0.046 (0.039) 
Capital controls 
  
-1.194*** (0.206) -0.741** (0.241) -0.816** (0.267) 
Trade intensity 
    
14.962*** (3.785) 19.076*** (4.287) 
Industrial similarity 
      
-0.001 (0.014) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.492 
 
0.579 
 
0.619 
 
0.648   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.048 
 
0.128 
 
0.186 
 
0.286   
F statistics 0.911 
 
1.282† 
 
1.428* 
 
1.791***   
  
       
  
N 335  335  328  277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Appendix 10: Robustness check – differences in sample 
TABLE 13a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 FOR PERIOD TWO AND THREE 
Variables 
Intercept 0.649** (0.221) -5.695*** (0.786) -7.710*** (0.920) -3.670 ** (1.230) 
Structural deficit divergence 0.084* (0.040) 0.068* (0.032) 0.064* (0.032) 0.046 (0.023) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.087 (0.168) -0.318* (0.140) -0.374** (0.139) -0.579*** (0.136) 
Trade intensity 22.904*** (2.761 ) 27.192*** (3.228 ) 16.791 *** (3.770) 
Industrial similarity 0.007 (0.015) 0.014 (0.014) 
Capital controls -1.511*** (0.334) 
    
R
2
 0.500 0.671 0.709 0.753   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.141 0.242 0.360 0.452   
F statistics 0.780 1.565** 2.038*** 2.504***   
    
N 307   307   256   256   
TABLE 13b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 FOR PERIOD TWO AND THREE 
Variables 
Intercept 1.340*** (0,120) -4.068*** (0.954) -5.670*** (1,138) -3.895** (1.338) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.033 (0,032) 0.004 (0.029) 0.008 (0,029) 0.026 (0.029) 
Interest payments divergence -0.185*** (0,037) -0.107** (0.036) -0.118** (0,039) -0.090* (0.040) 
Trade intensity 17.834*** (3.127) 22.754 *** (3,555) 17.520 *** (4.110) 
Industrial similarity -0.014 (0,015) -0.007 (0.015) 
Capital controls -0.901* (0.375) 
    
R
2
 0.574 0.658 0.694 0.708   
Adjusted R
2
 0.028 0.213 0.326 0.353   
F statistics 1.051 1.479** 1.889*** 1.993***   
    
N 307   307   256   256   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 14a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 (3 OR MORE YEARS PER OBSERVATION) 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.149*** (0.196) -7.569*** (0.868) -9.227***  (1.038 ) -3.900***  (1.269)  
Structural deficit divergence -0.039 (0.028)  -0.027  (0.027) -0.024 (0.028)  0.042 (0.027) 
Cyclical deficit divergence  -0.238 (0.171) -0.555*** ( 0.157) -0.628***  (0.166) -0.715*** (0.145) 
Trade intensity 
  
30.780 *** (3.051)  33.845*** (3.322 ) 18.327*** (3.886) 
Industrial similarity 
    
 0.001 (0.017)  0,009  (0.015) 
Capital controls 
      
-1.553***  (0.259)    
  
       
  
R
2
 0.406 
 
0.406 
 
0.700 
 
0.773   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.253 
 
0.249 
 
0.327 
 
0.487   
F statistics 0.617 
 
 1.575** 
 
 1.879*** 
 
2.705***   
  
       
  
N 328  301  252  252   
TABLE 14b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 (3 OR MORE YEARS PER OBSERVATION) 
Variables 
    Intercept  1.360*** (0.120) -6.465***  (1.083) -7.443*** (1.290) -4.518** (1.429) 
Primary deficit divergence  -0.032 (0.031)  0.023 (0.031) 0.033 (0.031) 0.059† (0.030) 
Interest payments divergence  -0.208*** (0.036) -0.101* (0.042) -0.121** (0.044) -0.085† (0.043) 
Trade intensity 
  
25.472*** 3.500 28.074*** (3.788) 19.113*** (4.245) 
Industrial similarity 
    
-0.017 (0.017) -0.007 (0.016) 
Capital controls 
      
-1.041*** (0.267) 
  
     
 
 
  
R
2
 0.520 
 
0.666 
 
0.683 
 
0.721   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.013 
 
0.211 
 
0.290 
 
0.369   
F statistics 0.975 
 
 1.463* 
 
1.736** 
 
 2.051***   
  
       
  
N 328  301  252  252   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 15a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 EXCLUDING DENMARK, SWEDEN AND THE UK 
Variables 
    Intercept 0.813  (0.235) -5.079*** (0.832)  -7.023*** (0.982) -2.476* (1.076) 
Structural deficit divergence 0.303 (0.223) 0.002 (0.030) 0.001  (0.029) 0.052* (0.025)  
Cyclical deficit divergence 
  
0.004 (0.192) 0.011 (0.195) -0.308† (0.168) 
Trade intensity 
  
2.6296*** (3.043) 28.311*** (3.314) 14.149*** (3.511) 
Specialization 
    
-0.027† (0.016) -0.002 (0.013) 
Capital controls 
      
-1.539*** (0.240) 
  
       
  
R
2
 0.339 
 
0.577 
 
0.641 
 
0.760   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.430 
 
0.051 
 
0.239 
 
0.485   
F statistics 0.441 
 
1.097 
 
1.594 
 
2.761***   
N 226   221   179   179   
TABLE 15b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 EXCLUDING DENMARK SWEDEN AND THE UK 
Variables 
    Intercept 1.490*** (0.134) -3.992*** (0.964) -5.490*** (1.139) -2.629* (1.165) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.053 (0.034) -0.014 (0.032) -0.008 (0.030) 0.027 (0.027) 
Interest payments divergence -0.173*** (0.040) -0.078†  (0.040) -0.098*  (0.040)  -0.051 (0.037) 
Trade intensity 
  
18.525*** (3.235) 24.838*** (3.450) 15.132*** (3.640) 
Specialization 
    
-0.035* (0.015) -0.016 (0.014) 
Capital controls 
      
-1.150*** (0.234)   
  
       
  
R
2
 0.454 
 
0.595  
 
0.666 
 
0.741   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.181 
 
0.092 
 
0.291 
 
0.444   
F statistics 0.715 
 
1.182 
 
1.778** 
 
2.497***   
N 226   221   179   179   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Appendix 11: Robustness checks – inclusion of other controls 
TABLE 16a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 WITH LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variables 
Intercept 0.227 (0.541) -14.070*** (2.026) -15.340*** (2.063) -11.583*** (2.326) 
Structural deficit divergence 0.179† (0.091) 0,142* (0.058) 0.101 † (0.059) 0.108† (0.054) 
Cyclical deficit divergence 0.059 (0.433) -0.576† (0.287) -0.714* (0.285) -0.717** (0.259) 
Trade intensity 48.718*** (6.806) 47.282*** (6.5834) 37.667*** (6.943 ) 
Industrial similarity 0.054† (0.028) 0.053* (0.026) 
Capital controls -1.332** (0.487) 
Lagged Y 0.438* (0.161) 0.085 (0.113) 0.100 (0.109) 0.014 (0.104) 
    
R
2
 0.629 0.857 0.869 0.895   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.922 0.238 0.346 0.459   
F statistics 0.406 1.385 1.661† 2.051*   
    
N 172   172   156   156   
 TABLE 16b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 WITH LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variables 
Intercept 1.412*** (0.229) -15.999***  (2.660) -16.868*** (2.780) -15.557*** (3.079) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.026 (0.058) 0.177** (0.050) 0.167** (0.050) 0.167** (0.050) 
Interest payments divergence -0.203** (0.067) -0.204*** (0.045) -0.191*** (0.046) -0.170** (0.051) 
Trade intensity 54.367*** (8.292) 52.610*** (8.454) 49.103*** (9.165) 
Industrial similarity  0.028 (0.027) 0.031 (0.027) 
Capital controls -0.588 (0.593) 
Lagged Y 0.226 (0.143) -0.084 (0.106) -0.077 (0.106) -0.107 (0.111) 
    
R
2
 0.693 0.869 0.870  0.874   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.589 0.301 0.351 0.351   
F statistics 0.541 1.529† 1.677* 1.670†   
    
N 172   172   156   156   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 17a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 WITH TIME DUMMIES 
Variables 
Intercept 0.247 (0.253) -0.694 (1.134) -1.627 (1.370 ) -0.512 (1.499) 
Structural deficit divergence -0.008 (0.025) -0,003 (0.028) -0.013 (0.028) -0.005 (0.028) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.046 (0.122 ) -0.066 (0.130) -0.079 (0.134) -0.191 (0.148) 
Trade intensity 3.387 (4.025) 8.539* (4.303) 6.675 (4.398) 
Industrial similarity -0.022 (0.014) -0.017 (0.014) 
Capital controls -0.609† (0.344) 
Dummy period 2 0.355* (0.146) 0.333* (0.160) 0.153 (0.177) -0.100 (0.226) 
Dummy period 3 0.988*** (0.142) 0.909*** (0.174) 0.753*** (0.180) 0,425 (0.257) 
    
R
2
 0.694 0.697 0.712 0.726   
Adjusted R
2
 0.360  0.349 0.427 0.436   
F statistics 2.082*** 2.000*** 2.458*** 2.501***   
  
N 335   328   277   277   
TABLE 17b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 WITH TIME DUMMIES 
Variables 
Intercept 0.044 (0.181) -0.194  (1.137) -1.425 (1.343) -0.492 (1.477) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.024 (0.024) -0.026 (0.027) -0.019 (0.027) -0.004 (0.028) 
Interest payments divergence 0.065†  (0.036) 0.074† (0.038) 0.068† (0.039) 0.074†  (0.039) 
Trade intensity 0.923 (3.950) 6.700 (4.251) 4.854 (4.410) 
Industrial similarity -0.019 (0.014) -0.018 (0.014) 
Capital controls -0.483 (0.325) 
Dummy period 2 0.406*** (0.119) 0.364** (0.137) 0.226 (0.150 ) 0.025 (0.201) 
Dummy period 3 1.114*** (0.134) 1.069*** (0.169) 0.929*** (0.176) 0.696** (0.235) 
    
R
2
 0.701 0.705 0.725 0.730   
Adjusted R
2
 0.375 0.365 0.438 0.443   
F statistics 2.152*** 2.075*** 2.528*** 2.548***   
  
N 335   328   277   277   
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Appendix 12: Robustness check – different measure of dependent variable 
TABLE 18a: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 3 WITH TRANSFORMED CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (HP FILTERED DATA) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variables 
Intercept 0.823*** (0.196) -8.879*** (0.820) -10.779*** (0.961) -6.359*** (1.138) 
Structural deficit divergence 0.018 (0.029) 0.064* (0.025) 0.054* (0.025) 0.106*** (0.024) 
Cyclical deficit divergence -0.202 (0.172) -0.391** (0.131) -0.466*** (0.134) -0.533*** (0.120) 
Trade intensity 33.379*** (2.792) 34.370*** (3.107) 20.518*** (3.632) 
Industrial similarity 0.037** (0.013) 0.057*** (0.012) 
Capital controls -1.351*** (0.228) 
    
R
2
 0.229 0.601 0.632 0.707   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.590 0.153 0.258 0.406   
F statistics 0.280 1.342* 1.691** 2.348***   
    
N 335   328   277   277   
TABLE 18b: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION EQUATION 4 WITH TRANSFORMED CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (HP FILTERED DATA) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variables 
Intercept 1.329*** (0.118) -6.537*** (0.927) -7.776*** (1.114) -6.186*** (1.235) 
Primary deficit divergence -0.006  (0.029) 0.064* (0.026) 0.059* (0.026) 0.080** (0.027) 
Interest payments divergence -0.280*** (0.034) -0.198*** (0.032) -0.196*** (0.034) -0.169*** (0.035) 
Trade intensity 25.587*** (2.997) 26.637*** (3.364) 21.362*** (3.816) 
Industrial similarity  0.014 (0.013) 0.025† (0.013) 
Capital controls -0.648** (0.238) 
    
R
2
 0.456 0.644 0.664   
Adjusted R
2
 -0.121 0.244 0.323   
F statistics 0.791 1.612** 1.949***   
    
N 335   328   277       
† p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Summary 
The Preliminary Thesis Report forms the basis of our final Master of Science 
Thesis in Political Economy. Our problem definition is: Do shocks and business 
cycles constitute an explanation for the euro and debt crisis? 
 
We have developed four research questions: 
1. Is there correlation in business cycles between countries in the EMU? 
2. Is there correlation in economic shocks between countries in the EMU?  
3. Is there correlation in political shocks between the countries in the EMU? 
4. Do shocks explain potential differences in business cycles in the EMU? 
The three first questions will be answered by performing a quantitative correlation 
analysis of shocks (economic and political) and business cycles in the EMU 
member states. Our research will be a large N-study in which we include quarterly 
observations from 16 member states of the EMU from year 2000 to 2010. The 
fourth question will be answered by interpreting the results of the correlation 
analyses. 
 
The Preliminary Thesis Report presents an open-economy model to explain 
mechanisms of interaction between countries in a global economy. Further on, the 
report presents the theory of an optimum currency area in order to explore some 
important aspects of the stability of a currency area. We also include a review of 
empirical analyses based on the OCA theory, and criticism that focus on the 
importance of autonomy in performing fiscal policy within monetary unions. 
 
After the literature review, the report presents the history of the creation of EMU 
and introduces some of the unions’ most important characteristics.  
 
The models and theories presented in this report will form part of the analysis of 
findings in the final thesis.  
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1. Introduction 
The thesis is inspired by the American columnist James Surowiecki in the New 
Yorker and his essay about the euro crisis (Surowiecki 2010, May 24). Surowiecki 
highlights German attitudes towards rescuing Greece: why should Germans pay 
for “Greek fecklessness”? Merkel’s statements on bailout were followed by 
volatility in the market. Despite announced rescue packages to Greece and 
Portugal, the volatility did not seem to disappear. In November 2010, The 
Economist had various articles about the determinants of the euro crisis and how 
to save the euro. The articles focus on the differences between the Greek and Irish 
government’s responses to the debt crisis. The Greek government begged for a 
bail-out, while the Irish government preferred to attempt an independent solution 
to the problem. We became interested in why two governments, facing what 
appeared to be a similar economic crisis, would want to react differently to 
improve their country’s economic situation. 
 
The euro crisis seemed to be subject to strong political influences in addition to 
the economic context. This turns to the age old discussion of the role the 
government should play in the market. Adam Smith’s invisible hand seems to be 
on a downhill ride, while the Keynesian thought of government seems to be going 
uphill. The case of the euro crisis is unique, as the countries in trouble are 
restrained to pursue traditional economic tools to stabilize the economy. This is 
due to the membership in the European Monetary Union and overall the economic 
directives of the European Union. The fate of the economically troubled countries 
seems to be in the hands of politicians.  
 
1.1 Problem definition and research questions 
The current situation drew our interest to check for political and economic 
denominators for countries in the EMU. Our focus is on shocks and fluctuations in 
an open economy.  
 
Problem definition: 
Do shocks and business cycles constitute an explanation for the euro and debt 
crisis? 
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Research questions: 
5. Is there correlation in business cycles between countries in the EMU? 
6. Is there correlation in economic shocks between countries in the EMU?  
7. Is there correlation in political shocks between the countries in the EMU? 
8. Do shocks explain potential differences in business cycles in the EMU? 
 
The three first questions will be answered by performing a quantitative correlation 
analysis of shocks (economic and political) and business cycles in the EMU 
member states. The fourth question will be answered by interpreting the results of 
the correlation analyses.  
 
1.2 Research theme 
The research question is of current interest. During the last year, the stability of 
the euro has been highly debated because of Greece’s deficit that steered the 
country towards bankruptcy. In the wake of the EU’s and IMF’s bailout of 
Greece, the attention was drawn to Ireland, Spain and Portugal. When this is 
written, both Ireland and Portugal have received a rescue package.  
 
Before the introduction of the euro, there were many skeptics to the introduction 
of a common currency for member states of the EU. In 1997, when it was still 
uncertain whether the economic and monetary union would begin in January 
1999, Feldstein stated the following about the sustainability of the EMU:  
 
My own judgment is that, on balance, a European Monetary Union would be an 
economic liability. The gains from reduced transaction costs would be small and 
might, when looked at from a global point of view, be negative. At the same time, 
EMU would increase cyclical instability, raising the cyclical unemployment rate 
(Feldstein, The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: 
Political Sources of an Economic Liability, 1997, pp. 32-33). 
 
After years of growth and economic prosperity in the early years of the euro it 
seems that the trends are in favor of the skeptics.  
 
There exists an extensive amount of research on the correlation of economic and 
political shocks in the EMU and the influence of shocks on the stability of the 
monetary union. However, this research is mostly conducted prior to the recent 
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euro crisis. We intend to contribute to existing research by including recent data in 
our analysis. 
 
2. Definitions 
2.1 Shocks 
Economic shocks are unexpected events that affect the economy positively or 
negatively and thus cause deviations of output from its trend path, or as explained 
below, business cycles. The economic shocks can be either exogenous shocks or 
endogenous shocks, the latter being shocks caused by national policy-making  
(Buti and Sapir 1998).  
 
2.2 Business cycles 
Business cycles are economy-wide fluctuations in economic activity, meaning that 
the state of the economy repeatedly alternates between business cycle expansions 
characterized by rapid growth, and business cycle recessions characterized by 
declining economic activity (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen 2010). Understanding 
business cycles may help economists to offer advice to policy-makers on the 
possibility of reducing business fluctuations through macroeconomic stabilization 
policy, that is, monetary and fiscal policy.  
 
The American economists Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell (1946) emphasize 
several points in their definition of business cycles. Firstly, business cycles are 
characterized by a co-movement of a large number of economic activities. 
Secondly, business cycles are a phenomenon occurring in decentralized market 
economies. Thirdly, business cycles are characterized by periods of expansion of 
economic activity followed by periods of contradiction in which activity declines. 
Fourthly, a full business cycle lasts for more than a year. Lastly, business cycles 
are far from being strictly periodic although they repeat themselves. Thus, the task 
of business cycle theory is to explain the fluctuations around a growing time 
trend.  
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3. Literature review 
This thesis is about an open economy with a common currency region. In this 
section, we present an open-economy model, which stems from the works of the 
economists Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming. Further on, we present 
Mundell’s theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) and literature pursuing this 
theory. We also take into account the criticism of the OCA theory which focuses 
on the importance of fiscal policy as a stabilizing mechanism.  
 
3.1 Open economy model 
Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming developed a macroeconomic model for an 
open economy. Their model includes product and demand, and the money market. 
In addition, it takes into account balance of payments. 
 
In an open economy, nations try to achieve both internal and external balance. The 
internal goals include keeping domestic production up to the economy’s 
capabilities in order to achieve full employment of labor and other resources, to 
keep the economy growing over time, and to achieve price stability. The external 
goal is to achieve balance of payments at a national level (Pugel 2007). The model 
requires the assumption that the nation does not have influence on the world level 
of prices, rates and income. The prices are constant and there exists some slack in 
the economy. According to these assumptions, the supply will be equal to demand 
in equilibrium, which is expressed: 
Y = C + Id + G + (X – M) 
Where Y denotes GDP, C denotes consumption, Id denotes domestic investment, 
G denotes government spending on goods and services, and (X – M) denotes net 
export (export – import). Government spending on goods and services and 
decisions about taxations is treated as political decisions and constitutes the fiscal 
policy (Pugel 2007). Exports depend on the income of foreign countries. 
 
The Mundell-Fleming model consists of three markets (Pugel 2007)28. The three 
markets give the level of domestic product, the interest rate and the overall 
                                                 
28
 In the article Capital mobility and stabilization policy Mundell presents a fourth market, the 
capital market. The capital market is in equilibrium when foreigners and domestic banks are 
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balance of payments. The economy will converge towards equilibrium in the first 
and second market, giving the level of GDP and interest rate. This will decide the 
level of payments (Pugel 2007).  
 
The first market is the product-demand market. The aggregated demand for a 
nation’s production depends on national income and the interest rate, since a high 
interest rate discourages spending (Pugel 2007). The investment-spending curve 
(IS-curve) shows all combinations of domestic product levels and interest rate 
levels when the domestic product market is in equilibrium. In a graphic 
presentation the horizontal axis gives values of GDP (Y), and the vertical axis 
gives values of interest rate (i). The IS-curve slopes downward. Given that 
national savings equals the sum of domestic investment and net exports, the 
equilibrium in the domestic product market is: 
S(Y) = Id + X – M(Y) 
In this model, changes in the aggregate demand not caused by interest rate will 
cause a shift. The changes are usually called exogenous shocks and include: 
expansionary fiscal policy, an exogenous increase in household consumption, an 
exogenous increase in domestic real investment, an exogenous increase in export, 
and an exogenous decrease in imports (Pugel 2007, 531). These variables cause a 
shift in the IS-curve to the right.  
 
The second market is the money-supply market. The supply side of the market for 
units of a nation’s money is “money supply”. The most important influences of 
the money supply are monetary policies (set by the central banks), and regulations 
and actions that determine the availability of bank deposits and currency in 
circulation (Pugel 2007, 531). The nominal demand of money depends on the 
nominal GDP (which is the price level times real GDP).  The larger the domestic 
product is during a time period, the greater the amount of money balances that 
firms and households will want to keep on hand for larger level of transactions. 
The value of transactions should be correlated with the value of income or 
production (Pugel 2007, 532). There is an opportunity cost of holding money, 
namely the lost interest that would be gained by investing the money. Thus a high 
                                                                                                                                      
willing to accumulate the increase in net debt of the government and the public (R. A. Mundell 
1963).  
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interest rate will lower the increase for money (as it is an incentive to hold 
interest-earning bonds). How people decide to hold their money is termed the 
money demand function (Pugel 2007). The demand for nominal money is 
expressed: 
L = L(PY,i) 
This gives the equilibrium between money supply and money demand: 
Ms = L(PY,i) 
 
The liquidity-money curve (LM-curve) gives the combinations of production 
levels and interest rates for which the money market is in equilibrium, given the 
money supply, the price level and the money demand function. In this curve 
money demand is understood to be the demand for the most highly liquid 
financial assets in the economy (Pugel 2007). The LM-curve slopes upwards. 
Changes in any other factor than interest rates and domestic product represent 
exogenous shocks which cause shifts in the LM-curve. These shocks can be 
expansionary monetary policy, decrease in the country’s average price level, and 
exogenous decrease in money demand (Pugel 2007). These changes will cause a 
shift to the left.   
 
The third market is the foreign exchange market. It is also called balance of 
payments when the country’s official settlements balance is used to reflect the net 
private trading between the country’s currency and a foreign currency. The 
official settlement balance (B) is the sum of the country’s current account balance 
(CA) and the country’s capital account balance (KA).  
 
The current account balance includes the net value of flows of goods, services, 
income and unilateral transfers, in other words the balance on goods and services 
trade. The current account balance must add to zero, because it is double entry 
book-keeping. The current account depends negatively on the domestic product, 
through the demand for imports. If the current account is in surplus, then the 
country’s foreign assets are growing faster than its foreign liabilities. In this 
scenario the net foreign investment is positive, and the country is acting as a 
lender to other countries. In the opposite scenario, when the net foreign 
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investment is negative, the country is a net borrower from other countries (Pugel 
2007).  
 
The capital account balance includes the net value of flows of financial assets and 
similar claims.29 The capital accounts are mostly assets traded; it is any flows of 
earnings on foreign assets. The international capital flows depend on the interest 
rates. The capital account excludes official international reserve asset flows (Pugel 
2007). 
 
The official settlement balance is expressed:   
B = CA (Y) + KA (i) 
The equation shows that an increase in the domestic product will lower the current 
account surplus. This is because of an increase in demand of foreign goods and 
services. A higher interest rate attracts foreign capital inflow. This is in the short 
run. Over the long run this effect will stop, and be reversed (Pugel 2007, 534).   
 
The foreign exchange curve (FE-curve) shows all interest and production 
combinations in our country that result in a zero value for the country’s official 
settlement balance. The FE-curve slopes upward. Examples of exogenous shocks 
that shift the FE-curve to the right are: an exogenous increase in exports, an 
exogenous decrease in imports, and exogenous changes that result in an increase 
in capital inflows or a decrease in capital outflows (Pugel 2007, 535).   
 
If a country adopts a fixed exchange rate, any divergence between the IS-LM 
intersection and the FE-curve shows that official intervention is needed to defend 
the fixed exchange rate. The official settlements balance will not be zero, and 
official intervention to defend the fixed exchange rate results in official reserves 
transactions (Pugel 2007).  
 
Official reserves transactions are money-like assets that are held by governments 
and that are recognized by governments as fully acceptable for payments between 
them (Pugel 2007). Official refers to assets held by monetary-type officials, 
                                                 
29
 IMF uses the term financial account for most of this part of the balance of payments. 
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including more than the government. The purpose of the distinction between 
official and non-official is to focus on the monetary task of regulating currency 
values. In the early twentieth century, gold was the major official reserve assets, 
today most countries use foreign exchange assets as official reserve assets. 
Foreign exchange assets are financial assets denominated in a foreign currency 
that is readily acceptable in international transactions (Pugel 2007, 361). The 
official settlements balance plus official reserves assets should equal zero.  
B = CA + KA 
B + OR = 0 
 
When the Mundell-Fleming model is applied to regions, one will get a monetary 
union with fixed exchange rates and with a single monetary authority that 
conducts a single union-wide monetary policy. Thus, each country has given up 
on the ability to use exchange rates to correct for domestic imbalances.  
 
3.2 Optimum Currency Areas   
In 1961, the article “A theory of optimum currency areas” by Robert Mundell was 
published. In the article, Mundell argues that the optimum area for a single 
currency is a region. The argument is based on balance of payments.  
 
Mundell stresses that a flexible exchange rate is often presented as a “device 
whereby depreciation can take the place of unemployment when the external 
balance is in deficit, and appreciation can replace inflation when it is in surplus” 
(Mundell, 1961, s. 657). In a currency area the exchange rate will be fixed, which 
leads to the question of what is the proper domain of a currency area.  
 
The first part of the thesis concerns currency areas and common currencies. 
Mundell points out that a single currency implies a single central bank, which will 
challenge possible need of adjustment between countries. In a scenario with two 
countries and balance of payments equilibrium, there is a shift in demand from 
country B to A. The prices and wages are set in the short run. B must reduce real 
income, and if this cannot be done by trade, it must be done by reduction in output 
employment. Another scenario follows: several regions in a closed economy with 
one currency. Mundell explains that in this scenario, where the government 
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pursues full employment policy, the money supply will be increased. This will 
provoke inflationary pressure in A, creating a multiregional bias. “The pace of 
inflation is set by the willingness of central authorities to allow unemployment in 
deficit regions” (Mundell, 1961, s. 659). He then discusses the world economy, 
and concludes that inflation and unemployment between its members cannot be 
avoided, thus eliminating the world as an optimum currency area.  
 
When discussing national currencies and flexible exchange rate, Mundell presents 
the argument that if there is a demand shift between two countries and with 
respective national currencies, the imbalance can be corrected for by either 
depreciation or appreciation. In this case, Mundell refers to an example of two 
countries where one currency fluctuates next to the other, and two regions without 
national boundaries. He explains that a shift in demand between the regions will 
lead to inflation or unemployment between the countries due to the exchange rate 
or a combination of both between the regions. The flexible exchange rate system 
will not correct balance of payments between regions, but between the two 
countries.     
 
In the next scenario, Mundell says that if the regions had two currencies and the 
exchange rate was pegged, then there may not be inflation or unemployment in 
the case of shift in demand, but appreciation. He explains that the system of 
flexible exchange rates was propounded as an alternative to the gold standard, 
which has been argued to cause the great depression in 1929. However, because of 
the foreign trade multiplier30, the common currency would face the same 
challenge. Interregional balance of payments would be invisible because of “the 
no escape from self-adjusting effects of interregional money flows” (Mundell, 
1961, s. 660). If the case for flexible exchange rate is strong, then the flexible 
exchange rate should be based on regional currencies, not national currencies. 
 
When discussing the practical application of his theoretical scenarios, Mundell 
stresses that the theory of international trade is based upon the Ricardian 
assumption that factors of production are mobile internally, but immobile 
                                                 
30
 Foreign trade multiplier can be described as the effect an increase in home demand has on a 
country's foreign trade. 
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internationally. He argues that the argument for flexible exchange rate is only as 
valid as the Ricardian assumption about factor mobility (Mundell, 1961, s. 661). 
In this scenario, the flexible interest rate would be effective if regions cut across 
boundaries or countries are multiregional and reorganize the currency on a 
regional level. The reorganization should be possible if it is accompanied by a 
profound political change as the currency is an expression of national sovereignty 
(Mundell, 1961, s. 661). Mundell then presents an argument on the common 
currency and Western Europe, and discuss whether the capital mobility in Europe 
is enough present for a fixed exchange rate. He refers to Meade (1957) who does 
not believe Europe is ready, and to Scitovsky (1958) who acknowledges that labor 
mobility and supranational employment policies must be improved, but believes 
that a common currency would stimulate capital mobility.  
 
Mundell argues that the stabilization argument for flexible exchange rate is only 
valid if the world is divided in regions. A separate currency that fluctuates relative 
to other currencies, could be obtained of the factor mobility is high 
intraregionally, and it is immobility interregionally.   
 
3.3 The Mundell trade-off 
Others authors base their research on Mundell’s theory of an optimum currency 
area. There are two sets of reasons, economic and political, which are offered for 
the development of a single currency and central bank (McNamara, 2006). The 
more trade and investment activity there is across an area, the more desirable a 
single currency should be. The economic benefits from a single currency and 
monetary institution derive from eliminated transaction costs of doing business in 
many different currencies and eliminated risks to business associates with 
fluctuating currencies. Whether the increased trade within the monetary union is a 
good thing or not depends on the relative importance of trade-creating effects, 
meaning the increased trade among the member countries, and trade diverting-
effects, meaning the diversion of existing imports from countries outside the 
monetary union to countries inside it (Feldstein, 1997). However, the economic 
costs of giving up national currency might be substantially higher than the 
benefits. Moving monetary policy authority to a central bank means that monetary 
policy and the exchange rate cannot be tailored to fit national conditions but must 
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be collectively decided for the whole union. The trade-off between stabilization 
losses and transaction costs reductions is called the Mundell trade-off. Many 
researchers argue that a collective monetary policy is most appropriate if regional 
trade levels are high, labor is very mobile, economic shocks affect the different 
geographic parts of currency union in similar ways, there are compensating fiscal 
transfers across the monetary union to make up for uneven economic 
development. 
 
3.4 Business cycles, shocks and stabilization 
Business cycles and shocks are important aspects of the OCA theory. All 
economies experience fluctuations in economic activity, and these fluctuations 
may persist for periods of several quarters to several years. There is a definite 
tendency for the business cycles of developed economies to move together 
(Baxter 1995). When economic fluctuations in two or more countries are 
symmetric, the need for stabilization policy is also symmetric (Buti and Sapir 
1998). On the other hand, when cycle is not synchronized, the needs for 
stabilization policies will differ. If economic fluctuations in countries within a 
monetary union are asynchronous, the member states will have little incentive to 
adopt common policies and to cooperate in the operation of the union.  
 
Many authors have pointed out that the costs of a monetary union depend on how 
symmetric or asymmetric the shocks hitting the member countries are (Funke 
1997). The reasoning for this statement is that the loss involved in not making use 
of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic adjustment will 
be, ceteris paribus, smaller when shocks require little movement of the real 
exchange rate to establish equilibrium. Normally, this tends to happen when 
shocks are symmetric rather than asymmetric. 
 
The literature on business cycle synchronization and shocks is extensive. Many 
authors have done comparisons between the business cycles in the states of the 
US and the countries of the EMU, the only monetary unions in the world today. 
For example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) found that demand and supply 
shocks are more correlated between states in the US than in Europe, and that the 
US states adjust more quickly to economic fluctuations than European countries. 
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Wynne and Koo (2000) also found that business cycles are more aligned in the 
United States than in the euro zone (of 11 member states). 
 
Other researchers have looked at changes in correlation patterns over time. One 
example on this issue is the findings of Furceri and Karras (2006). Analyzing 
cyclical output for the EU-15 countries they found that business-cycle 
synchronization has increased for many countries from 1980–1991 to 1992–2003. 
 
The literature has also considered the implications of the EMU for fiscal policy 
(Furceri & Karras, 2008). The EMU does not have a central fiscal authority. 
Nevertheless, much literature has shown that the ability of the national policies of 
the EMU member states to smooth asymmetric shocks is modest. This means that 
business-cycle synchronization is very important because it reduces the 
probability of asymmetric shocks and because it is reasonable to suppose the 
European Central Bank to implement stabilizing intervention with caution when 
responding to collective shocks.  
 
The literature is much thinner on whether the single currency has actually made 
the EU countries more or less similar in business-cycle terms. Literature has not 
converged on a single interpretation of the likely effects of the creation of a 
monetary union on the business cycles of EMU countries (Altavilla, 2004). Some 
authors argue that increasing intra-EMU trade along with decreasing capital 
controls leading to a more integrated economic system will result in a 
homogeneous currency area where asymmetric shocks are hard to verify. Others, 
like Krugman (1991), assert that the business cycles of the EMU countries will 
become less synchronized as the result of a specialization process followed by the 
increasing commercial integration of the participating economies. However, 
Furceri and Karras (2008) found that all countries in their EU sample are better 
synchronized with the EMU-wide economy in the post-EMU period than they 
were before the euro. They also showed that this increase in synchronization is 
present in all components of aggregate demand and supply, but is more 
pronounced in the trade components, that is imports and exports.  In addition, they 
showed that the increase in trade within the EMU area is at least partly 
responsible for the increase in cyclical synchronization. 
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3.5 Fiscal policy 
Cooper and Kempf (2004) argue that high correlation of shocks across countries is 
not a necessary condition for the existence of net gains to a monetary union. In 
their opinion, the emphasis on the Mundell trade-off is misplaced because it 
ignores the significance of fiscal policy in determining the welfare gains from a 
monetary union. Thus, the Mundell trade-off between stabilization losses and 
transaction costs reductions from a common currency disappears once national 
fiscal policies are taken into account, and they stress the importance of the 
interactions between fiscal and monetary policies. Taking fiscal policies into 
account, they find that a monetary union is welfare increasing regardless of the 
correlation of shocks.  
 
Their multiple-country overlapping generations model has two key ingredients: 
risk sharing between unemployed and employed agents through unemployment 
insurance financed by income taxes (stabilization policy), and agent-specific taste 
shocks. Whether there is a stabilization loss from a monetary union depends on 
how well risks can be shared once monetary policy is delegated to a single central 
bank. Hence, the existence of country-specific fiscal policy instruments is the key. 
Agent-specific taste shocks are to create potential gains from reduction in trading 
frictions. 
 
In their theoretical analysis of a monetary union with fiscal policy incorporated 
into the analysis, the two co-authors find that, if the central bank holds the money 
supply constant and fiscal policy is used for internal stabilization, the risks are 
efficiently allocated within and across the economies, and the transactions gains 
from a common currency are realized without a stabilization loss. This means that 
a monetary union is welfare increasing regardless of the correlation of shocks. The 
net gains to a monetary union will depend on the design of fiscal and monetary 
institutions.  
 
To correct for imbalances in a specific country within a monetary union, fiscal 
policy is the only mechanism that can be used. According to Pugel there are two 
concerns with a monetary union without a common fiscal policy (Pugel 2007, 
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628). Since it is not a union-wide fiscal policy, there are few “automatic 
stabilizers” across countries. Higher tax revenues from the growing countries are 
not automatically shifted to the recession countries through lower taxes and larger 
spending. The second concern is if nations use their fiscal policy effectively. 
Pugel stresses that a major constraint is political, since fiscal changes can only be 
done through political decision-making. The constraints take the form of the 
process of enacting changes and the bureaucratic process of implementing them.  
 
 
4. Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union 
Monetary integration has two essential components: exchange rate union (one 
currency or fixed exchange rates) and capital market integration (El-Agraa, 2007). 
In the world today, there only exist two monetary unions, the dollar in the United 
States of America and the euro in the Economic and Monetary Union of the 
European Union. The EMU is special because it exists of different national states, 
while the US is one federation. Thus, unlike other monetary unions, the EMU 
does not have a central fiscal authority, but 17 member states31 of the EMU 
perform fiscal policy individually with some restrictions. 
 
4.1 The creation of EMU 
4.1.1 The Werner Report 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome has little to say about money. This is because the post-
war order for the market economies of Europe, North America and Japan was 
founded on the Bretton Woods system which provided the international 
framework for currency stability, with gold and the US dollar as the predominant 
monetary standards (The European Commission 2011a). 
 
From 1967, the prevailing world order for exchange rates, established as part of 
the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, began to fall apart (El-Agraa and Mayes 
2007). The European Community (EC) looked at the possibility of trying to create 
a locally stable system with the same sort of architecture for itself. At the 
                                                 
31
 The euro zone consists of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain. Estonia became a member in 2011. 
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European Summit in Hague in 1969, Heads of State and Government of the EC 
agreed to prepare a plan for economic and monetary union. They set up a 
committee led by Pierre Werner, at that time prime minister of Luxembourg, to 
consider the issues involved. The committee presented the final version of their 
plan, the Werner Report, in October 1970. This was endorsed by the Council in 
February 1971. The Council decided that the EMU could be attained during that 
decade, if the plan had the permanent political support of the member 
governments (El-Agraa and Mayes 2007). However, the EMU project experienced 
serious setbacks from the crises arising from the non-convertibility of the US 
dollar into gold in August 1971 and from rising oil prices in 1972. An attempt to 
limit the fluctuations of European currencies, using a ‘snake in the tunnel’32, 
failed.  
 
4.1.2 The European Monetary System 
A new proposal for EMU was put forward in 1977 by the then president of the 
European Commission, Roy Jenkins. It approved in a limited form and launched 
as the European Monetary System (EMS) in March 1979, with the participation of 
all Member States’ currencies except the British pound, which joined later in 1990 
but only stayed for two years. This system was based on stable but adjustable 
exchange rates of the national currencies in relation to the newly created European 
Currency Unit (ECU). Currency fluctuations were controlled through the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The EMS was a radical innovation because 
exchange rates could only be changed by mutual agreement between participating 
Member States and the Commission (The European Commission, 2011b). 
 
4.1.3 The Delors Report 
At the EC summit in Hanover in 1988, the heads of state decided to appoint a 
committee chaired by Jacques Delors, then president of the EC Commission, to 
study and propose concrete stages leading towards a monetary union (El-Agraa 
and Mayes 2007). The Delors Report pointed out that the creation of the EMU 
                                                 
32
 ‘The snake in the tunnel’ was an attempt at creating a single currency band for the European 
Economic Community (EEC), essentially pegging all the EEC currencies to one another. The 
Smithsonian agreement set bands of ±2.25% for currencies to move relative to their central rate 
against the US dollar. This provided a tunnel in which European currencies to trade. 
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must be seen as a single process in three stages which led to the ultimate goal of a 
single currency with an independent European Central Bank, and that the decision 
to enter upon the first stage should commit a member state to the entire process. 
Further on, the EMU would require a common monetary policy and a high degree 
of compatibility of economic policies and consistency in other policy areas, 
particularly in the fiscal field (El-Agraa and Mayes 2007).  
 
The three stages towards the EMU were: 
Stage 1 (1990-1994): This stage included the completion of the internal market 
and the removal of restrictions of further financial integration. 
Stage 2 (1994-1999): This stage included the establishment of the European 
Monetary Institute to strengthen central bank co-operation and prepare for the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In addition, it included defining the 
future governance of the euro area and achieving economic convergence between 
the member states.  
Stage 3 (1999 and continuing): This stage included fixing the final exchange rates 
and transition to the euro, establishing the ECB and ESCB with independent 
monetary policy-making, and implementing binding budgetary rules in the 
member states (The European Commission, 2011c). 
 
4.1.4 The Maastricht Treaty 
The Madrid European Council of June 1989 decided to proceed to the first stage 
of EMU in July 1990 and the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) or the 
Maastricht Treaty set the ‘Maastricht convergence criteria’ that member states 
would have to meet in order to adopt a single currency (see 4.2.4). The heads of 
state and government at the European Council at Maastricht in December 1991 
approved the TEU in which it also was decided that Europe would have a stable 
single currency by the end of the century. 
 
4.2 Governance of the EMU and the European Central Bank 
The European Central Bank (ECB) makes the monetary policy for the EMU 
member states. Together with the national central banks the ECB make up the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (TEC) gives the ESCB power to ‘define and implement 
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monetary policy of the Community’, and ensures that the ESCB will act without 
instruction ‘from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a 
Member State, or from any other body’. This means that the Governing Council 
of the ESCB is the sole judge of what it should and should not do. Technically, 
monetary policy actions are taking by the Governing Council of the ESCB33, but 
in practice, monetary policy decisions are communicated by the president of the 
ECB or by its press office. Therefore, it is convenient to ascribe the responsibility 
of the monetary policy of the euro zone to the ECB (Jones, 2006). The ECB aims 
to provide a stable economic environment across the EU (McNamara, 2006).  
 
4.2.1 The powers of the ECB 
In the past two decades, there has been an increasing consensus in Europe on the 
importance of price stability and central bank independence. This consensus has 
been an important underlying contributor to exchange rate stability in advance of 
EMU (McNamara, 2006). There is a belief that monetary policy cannot have any 
long-lasting influence on real economic variables such as output growth and 
employment. The executive board of the ECB developed a two-track operational 
approach: monetary targeting (amount of money is measured) and inflation 
targeting.  
 
4.2.2 Rules governing the euro zone 
The rules governing the euro zone are unambiguous. The TEC declares that ‘the 
primary objective’ of the common monetary policy is ‘to maintain price stability’ 
(Jones, 2006). Thus, the ECB goal when managing the interest rate is to maintain 
low inflation. The TEC also mentions the possibility that euro zone monetary 
policy will be used to ‘support the general economic policies of the Community’. 
However, any such action should be ‘without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability’ (Jones, 2006).  
 
The ECB has defined price stability according to two different monetary 
indicators: the growth of monetary liquidity and the expected rate of inflation. 
Liquidity growth should be measured against a reference value of 4,5 per cent 
                                                 
33
 The Governing Council of the ESCB includes representatives of each member state central 
banks in the euro zone, plus the six members of the executive board of the ECB. 
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increase per annum and medium-term estimates should place the inflation rate 
below 2 per cent per annum (Jones, 2006). If the liquidity growth and inflation are 
above target, the ECB may see a threat to price stability and respond by raising 
interest rate, while if the liquidity growth and inflation are below target, the ECB 
may lower interest rate in order to encourage the pace of economic activity in the 
euro zone.  
 
4.2.3 Exchange rate policy 
The rules governing exchange rate policy are most notable for their absence. The 
Treaty on European Union was unclear in the area of exchange rate policy making 
for the euro than for monetary policy. What matters here concerns relations 
between the euro and third countries’ currencies. This means relations between 
the euro and the dollar (Jones, European Macroeconomic Governance, 2006). The 
presumption was always that an explicit exchange rate policy would not be 
necessary given the relative size of the euro zone and its limited exposure to the 
outside world. Exchange rate policy matters only as it impacts on the priority 
given to maintain price stability (Taylor 2004). The decision to enter into a formal 
exchange rate agreement with non-EU countries is the responsibility of The 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), and any such agreement would 
be binding on the ECB. The Council could formulate general guidelines to limit 
exchange rate movements. However, these guidelines orientations shall also be 
without prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability 
(Jones, 2006). 
 
4.2.4 Fiscal policy 
In a country, economic and monetary integration would involve having a 
countrywide fiscal policy as well as a single monetary policy. However, in the 
case of EMU, the EU has not attempted this level of integration. The centralized 
budget amounts to only around 1 per cent of EU GDP and at this level cannot 
constitute a real macroeconomic policy instrument (El-Agraa, 2007). The EU 
adopts a different approach, which is to constrain the ability of the member states 
to run independent fiscal policies. These constraints are to avoid excessive fiscal 
deficits and ‘to respect the medium-term budgetary objective of close to balance 
or in surplus’ (Jones, European Macroeconomic Governance, 2006, p. 332). There 
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are three types of constraints: the Maastricht criteria, the Stability and Growth 
Pact, and annual settings of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.  
 
The Maastricht criteria were designed to ensure that a member state’s economy 
was sufficiently prepared for the adoption of the euro. These are constraints 
designed to impose prudence on fiscal policy so that no one country’s debt can 
start to raise the interest rates or lower the credit rating of the other EMU 
countries. These ‘fiscal convergence criteria’ limit the budget deficit to be below 
3% of GDP and the gross public debt to be below 60% of GDP. The deficit 
criterion implicitly amounts to a current balanced budget rule, that is, the current 
revenues should equal current expenditure (Corsetti and Roubini 1995).  
 
The Stability and Growth Pact operationalizes the membership requirements for 
the continuing behavior of the member states inside EMU. The coordination 
among the member states takes place through the framework of Ecofin, assisted 
by the Commission, and includes the ability to impose financial penalties on 
member states that do not adhere to the prudent limits. A government whose 
budget deficit exceeds 3% of GDP or whose public dept exceeds 60% of GDP 
may be required to correct its situation, and may be subject to sanctions and 
penalties if it fails to do so. 
 
Annual setting of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines: Every year there is 
discussion among the member states to try to set a framework for policy 
consistent with the longer-term objectives of the EU and an informal dialogue 
between the fiscal and monetary authorities 
 
 
5. Methodology 
In order to define the method of the thesis, we repeat the problem definition and 
the research questions. 
 
Problem definition: 
Do shocks and business cycles constitute an explanation for the euro and debt 
crisis?  
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Research questions: 
1. Is there correlation in business cycles between countries in the EMU? 
2. Is there correlation in economic shocks between countries in the EMU?  
3. Is there correlation in political shocks between the countries in the EMU? 
4. Do shocks explain potential differences in business cycles in the EMU? 
 
The three first questions will be answered by performing a quantitative correlation 
analysis of shocks (economic and political) and business cycles in the EMU 
member states. Below we explain how we plan to develop this study. The fourth 
question will be answered by interpreting the results interpreting of the correlation 
analyses.  
 
5.1 Variables 
5.1.1 Measuring business cycles 
Literature defines two main types of business cycle: the growth (or deviation) 
cycle and the classical cycle. The growth cycle defines alternating periods of 
expansion and contraction in macroeconomic activity with respect to deviations of 
the GDP growth rate from an appropriately defined trend rate of growth. The 
classical cycle, instead, identifies turning points on the basis of an absolute fall or 
rise in the value of GDP (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen 2010). 
 
Interesting variables to measure is thus: 
- Real GDP 
- GDP growth 
Alternative variables are: 
- Consumption 
- Investment 
- Labor input 
 
As stated above, the task of business cycle theory is to explain the fluctuations 
around a growing time trend. There is no single correct way of separating the 
cyclical component of a variable measuring business cycles, like GDP, and the 
growth trend. We need a method which allows for variation over time in the 
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underlying growth trend, but which nevertheless ensures that the short-term 
fluctuations are categorized as temporary cyclical deviations from the trend. One 
such method is the so-called Hodrick-Prescott filter34, named after the American 
economists Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen 
2010). We plan to use this method when measuring business cycles. We need to 
keep in mind that researchers have found that the HP filter tends to give imprecise 
estimates of the trend at the end-point series. For this reason, we plan to exclude 
the first and the last 12 estimated cyclical components of all quarterly time series, 
in line with common practice (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen 2010).  
 
5.1.2 Measuring shocks 
We begin with the premise that any empirical analysis of the correlation of shocks 
across countries or regions is intimately tied up with the challenge of identifying 
the actual shocks that were experienced. 
 
The shocks will be operationalized into variables. As stated above, shocks can be 
economic and political. We operationalize the variables by identifying the 
exogenous shocks that cause shifts in the three markets in Mundell and Fleming’s 
model.  
 
In the first market shocks can be: 
- Expansionary or restrictive fiscal policy 
o Government spending 
o Tax  
- An exogenous increase or decrease in household consumption 
o Consumer expectations about the future of the economy 
o Wealth 
- An exogenous increase or decrease in domestic real investment 
o Business expectations about the future of the economy 
- An exogenous increase or decrease in export 
o Foreign income 
o Shift in tastes of foreign consumers towards the country’s products 
                                                 
34
 For a full explanation of this method see Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010: 361-366). 
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o The international price competitiveness of the country’s products 
- An exogenous decrease or increase in imports 
o Shift in the tastes of local consumers away from imported products  
o The international price competitiveness 
 
In the second market the shocks can be: 
- Expansionary or restrictive monetary policy  
o Increase or decrease in the money supply 
- Decrease or increase in the country’s average price level 
o Consumer price index 
- Exogenous decrease or increase in money demand 
o Possible to borrow money 
 
In the third market exogenous shocks can be: 
- An exogenous increase or decrease in exports  
o Changes in foreign income 
o Shift in tastes of foreign consumers towards the country’s products 
o Improvement in the international price competitiveness of the 
country’s products 
- An exogenous decrease or increase in imports 
o Shift in the tastes of local consumers away or towards from 
imported products 
o Improvement in the international price competitiveness of the 
country’s products 
- An exogenous changes that result in an increase in capital inflows or a 
decrease in capital outflows 
o Changes in the foreign interest rate 
o Changes in the expected rate of appreciation or depreciation of the 
country’s currency  
o Changes in the perceived riskiness if investing in the country’s 
financial assets 
 
From this identification we will in the final thesis classify shocks into economic 
and political categories.  
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5.2 Data and databases 
Due to the fact that there exits an extensive amount of research about business 
cycles and shocks in relation to monetary unions, it is appropriate to conduct a 
quantitative study. Our research will be a large N-study in which we include 
observations of the aforementioned variables from 16 member states of the 
EMU.35 We plan to use quarterly time-series data for the EMU member countries 
from the time interval 2000- 2010.36 
 
Various public databases may provide us with the requested data. One of them is 
the statistic database of the International Monetary Fund. The IMF publishes a 
range of time series data on economic and financial indicators.  
 
Another database that may provide us with necessary information is Eurostat. This 
is the statistical office of the European Unions, and it offers a range of statistics 
for the EMU countries. 
 
The statistics provided by the European Central Bank may also be an appropriate 
database for our study. 
   
6. Project progress 
The final deadline for the thesis is set to September 1st 2011.  
January 17th:  Due date preliminary thesis report 
February:  Finish literature review and state of the art, and finish theory and  
methodology chapters 
March:  Collecting data, and begin quantitative analysis 
April:  Conduct quantitative analysis 
May: Finish quantitative analysis, review theory and 
methodology chapters 
June :  Conclude analysis 
                                                 
35
 Estland will be excluded because the country became a member of the EMU in 2011.  
36
 We take into account that Cyprus became a member in 2008, Greece in 2001, Malta in 2008, 
Slovakia in 2009, and Slovenia in 2009. Data from these countries will only be included from the 
year they entered into the EMU. 
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July:  Write final thesis 
September 1st: Final deadline for handing in thesis 
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